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Abstract 
 
Sponsored by Air Combat Command (ACC), the purpose of this research was to 
examine the impact that current USAF Quality Assurance (QA) manning practices has on 
key aircraft wing- and unit-level metrics.  
Interviews and surveys culminated in development of a QA Manning 
Effectiveness Matrix.  We then used the matrix to calculate historical QA manning 
effectiveness at 16 ACC bases.  Effectiveness scores were regressed with associated 
historical data for 26 metrics derived from a Delphi survey.  Nine metrics were deemed 
statistically significant, including break rates, cannibalization rates, flying schedule 
effectiveness rates, key task list pass rates, maintenance scheduling effectiveness rates, 
quality verification inspection pass rates, repeat rates, dropped objects counts and 
safety/technical violations counts.  An example benefit cost analysis for changes in QA 
manning effectiveness was performed, using reasonable cost values.  The results present 
compelling evidence for aircraft maintenance managers to carefully weigh decisions to 
leave QA manning slots empty, or to assign personnel possessing other than authorized 
credentials.  Furthermore, aircraft maintenance managers can use this tool to help 
determine mitigating strategies for improving unit performance with respect to the nine 
metrics.  
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EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF QUALITY ASSURANCE MANNING  
PRACTICES IN USAF AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE UNITS 
I.  Introduction 
Overview 
USAF combat aircraft flying units are the main focus of this research.  These 
flying units require thousands of maintenance technicians, all performing a myriad of 
distinctive and specialized functions in order to safely execute launch, recovery, 
servicing, re-arming, and modification operations.  Key to ensuring that the countless 
critical steps involved in these activities are executed according to written direction is 
having proactive and involved leadership and management at all levels of execution.  
However, since the effective reach of unit leaders and managers is extremely limited, 
they rely heavily on a highly structured cadre of experienced and skilled technicians who 
provide daily oversight, an on-the-spot correction capability, training, an investigative 
capacity, and a mechanism for formal feedback to leadership to use for analysis and 
possible future mitigation of underlying causal factors.  This cadre of experts is formally 
known as the Maintenance Group Quality Assurance Flight.     
Problem Statement 
Mid-level Air Force managers and leaders in aircraft maintenance units need to 
know the potential mission impact of leaving validated Unit Manpower Document 
(UMD) authorized Quality Assurance (QA) manpower positions unfilled or of assigning 
personnel with mismatched Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) against these positions.  
This research will attempt to systematically identify and quantify possible impacts and 
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consequences that leaving QA manpower positions unfilled or “mismatching” personnel 
against QA manpower slots designated on the Unit Manpower Document (UMD) could 
have on safety, quality, and mission capability factors in order to assist Air Force 
maintenance managers when making these important QA manning decisions.   
Background 
Recent research conducted at the Air Force Institute of Technology revealed a 
statistical correlation between aircraft mission capable rates (the primary metric in the 
USAF that measures the percentage of assigned aircraft capable of meeting their primary 
mission), and manning levels along with experience levels of assigned aircraft 
maintenance personnel (Oliver, 2001).  This study attempts to build on this premise by 
focusing on one high-demand; low-density manpower resource – the aircraft/munitions 
maintenance quality assurance (QA) flight. 
A 1996 General Accounting Office (GAO) report to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee 
on Acquisition and Technology, Committee on Armed Services stated that Based on 
studies performed for DOD, we estimate that it spends more than $1.5 billion annually 
beyond what is necessary to support its quality assurance approach (GAO, 1996).  
Furthermore, traditional quality assurance techniques have historically relied upon many 
after-the-fact inspections, increasing costs in both time and money.  To remain profitable, 
manufacturers switched from detection, to prevention-based quality strategies which 
replaced end-item inspections.  Although the approach in the GAO report is primarily 
procurement and acquisition-related, prevention-based quality strategies has not become 
a reality in the United States Air Force (USAF).  More specifically, we in the Air Force 
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still rely heavily on our traditional QA as a detection function to catch problems before 
they escalate.   
Furthermore, the GAO's analysis of data reported by all services showed that 
human error contributed to seventy-three percent of Class A flight mishaps in Fiscal 
Years 1994 and 1995.  In Air Force mishaps, human error was a factor seventy-one 
percent of the time. For the Army, the figure was seventy-six percent. According to the 
Naval Safety Center, human error was a factor in eighty percent of the Navy and Marine 
Corps Class-A mishaps for Fiscal Years 1990 through 1994.  The fact that nearly three-
fourths of accidents have a human error factor doesn't necessarily mean that the human 
caused the problem.  Often, some other problem occurs, but at some point the human 
could have or should have intervened to change the course of events--and that someone is 
not always the pilot.  It could be anyone from the air traffic controller, to the 
maintenance crew (GAO, 1996). 
This point was tragically highlighted in May 1995, when an F-15 pilot was killed 
shortly after takeoff from one of our air bases. According to a 1998 “Aerospace World” 
report, the accident investigation revealed that a mechanic accidentally crossed flight 
control rods in the aircraft while reinstalling them and another mechanic failed to catch 
the miscue which made the jet impossible to control in the air (Grier, 1998).  Also 
according to the same report, several previous incidents in which other mechanics made 
the same mistakes should have alerted the Air Force to a potential problem.  In fact, the 
review board noted that similar crossed-rod cases occurred at least twice before, but in 
both instances, the problem was caught before takeoff.  Although the Air Force has since 
taken steps to ensure this mistake doesn’t happen again by color-coding the control rods 
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and adding a warning to the technical manuals (Grier, 1998), catching these types of 
design issues and ensuring flight-critical inspections are performed correctly are 
fundamental to the QA function.    
 
Figure 1 – F-16 Maintenance-Related Mishap (Photo Courtesy of USAF Safety Center) 
 
In several recent incidents, the impact of improper maintenance was deeply felt.  In 
the first case, an airman was performing an F-16 engine run at one of our bases when it 
“jumped” over the wooden wheel chocks designed to keep the aircraft from moving (see 
Figure 1).  The F-16 subsequently came to rest on its side damaging its right wing, nose 
gear, and right landing gear.  In a review of the mishap’s factual data by the Air Force 
Safety Center’s aircraft maintenance expert, the following maintenance-related facts were 
foundational to this mishap (Moening, 2005): 
• Using bad chocks (training and lack of management oversight). 
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• A temperature condition that provided more thrust than expected (training). 
• The technician had no previous training on what to do if the jet jumped chocks; 
the technician was following all unit procedures, but unit supervision chose to 
allow engine runs on packed snow and ice and didn't think the “jump chocks 
training” was important (gross leadership failure) (Moening, 2005). 
 
Figure 2 – F-15 Maintenance-Related Mishap (Photo Courtesy of USAF Safety Center) 
 
Another incident provides further proof of the value of correct maintenance.  In this case 
an F-15 aircraft was extensively damaged when an avionics access door came unlatched 
in flight (see Figure 2).  In a review of the mishap’s factual data by the Air Force Safety 
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Center’s aircraft maintenance expert, the following maintenance-related facts were 
foundational to this mishap (Moening, 2005): 
• During Phase inspection, the securing rings for the fasteners were not installed 
(training, procedural error, and lack of management oversight).  
• The panel was incorrectly secured after "red ball" maintenance (training, 
procedural error, and lack of management oversight) (Moening, 2005). 
A final example tries to answer a famous physics question: What happens when 
an irresistible force meets an immovable object?  In this case, the aircraft was on the 
losing end and a multi-million dollar fighter jet was severely damaged (see Figure 3).   
 
 
Figure 3 – F-16 Maintenance-Related Mishap (Photo Courtesy of USAF Safety Center) 
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The scenario involved an F-16 being towed during nighttime hours when it impacted an 
aircraft clear-water rinse structure.  The jet’s nose landing gear subsequently collapsed 
causing extensive damage to the nose landing gear, nose gear well, nose radome, and 
engine inlet structure.  In a review of the mishap’s factual data by the Air Force Safety 
Center’s aircraft maintenance expert, the following maintenance-related facts were 
foundational to this mishap (Moening, 2005): 
• The tow team supervisor who had only been on base one month was improperly 
trained (training consisted of being told “here's the book, read it") (failure of 
leadership).   
• The tow crew veered to the right of taxiway center line for no discernable reason 
resulting in the aircraft impacting the clear-water rinse structure (training and lack 
of management oversight) (Moening, 2005). 
These are all eye-opening examples of the importance of proper maintenance which 
further underscore the criticality of maintenance leadership, management, and oversight.   
Maintenance-Related Mishaps, Recent History 
 Table 1 explains the three mishap classes used in the USAF for both Flight and 
Ground categories while Figures 4 through 6 provide a high-level view of the impact that 
improper maintenance has on USAF mission readiness (note the middle columns in each 
individual FY in Figures 4 through 6 indicate maintenance-related mishaps only).  
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Table 1 – Air Force Mishap Classifications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Class-A Mishap Data (Source: USAF Safety Center) 
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Figure 5 – Class-B Mishap Data (Source: USAF Safety Center) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Class-C Mishap Data (Source: USAF Safety Center) 
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Furthermore, in Fiscal Year 2004 alone, USAF maintenance-related mishaps cost U.S. 
taxpayers $24,573,947.  The following is breakdown of those costs by mishap category:  
• Class A Mishaps  -  $10,433,572 
• Class B Mishaps  -  $5,584,814 
• Class C Mishaps  -  $8,555,561 
According to a 2005 USAF Safety Center Report, this is enough money to pay for 
• 5.4 - F100-PW-229 Engines at $4.5 Million each, or… 
• 652 - GBU-31 JDAMS (Joint Direct Attack Munitions) at $37,670 each, or… 
• 722,763 – man-hours at $34 per hour 
Maintenance-related mishaps create a massive opportunity cost or more specifically loss!  
The following is a top-ten breakout of what caused these maintenance-related mishaps 
(Moening, 2005): 
1) Failure to follow published Technical Data or local instructions 
2) Using an unauthorized procedure not referenced in Technical Data 
3) Supervisors accepting non-use of Technical Data or failure to follow maintenance 
requirements 
4) Failure to document maintenance in the AFTO Form 781 or engine work package 
5) Inattention to detail/complacency 
6) Incorrectly installing hardware on an aircraft/engine 
7) Performing an unauthorized modification to the aircraft 
8) Failure to conduct a tool inventory after completion of the task 
9) Personnel not trained or certified to perform the task 
10) Ground support equipment improperly positioned for the task 
 
 11
Since QA functions have historically been a critical process within any effective 
maintenance organization, the key to a aircraft maintenance QA flight’s effectiveness are 
the “qualities” of personnel assigned to the very limited manning slots.  The criticality of 
this concept is best illustrated by examining the composition of an average active duty 
USAF aircraft flying wing.   
  In order to get the “right” personnel mix, the Air Force performs extensive 
manpower studies to determine with great precision the proper AFSC and skill level 
combinations needed to populate a QA shop to enable it to perform its duties to include 
all exercise, war, and peacetime tasks.  However, because of resource constraints and a 
very high demand for this low-density, high-demand capability, maintenance managers 
and leaders are sometimes forced to make tradeoffs when deciding how to man QA 
manpower slots.   
Faced with constricted manning resources, maintenance leaders responsible for 
staffing QA are often forced to make difficult decisions to deviate from the UMD and 
substitute AFSCs or possibly even leave a QA manning slot vacant.  Although these 
substitution and vacancy decisions are not made in a vacuum, the potential impact of the 
“deal” is sometimes lost in the dilemma to either “fill a QA slot” or continue to produce 
maintenance on the flight line/in the maintenance shops.  This is because no tool 
currently exists to help maintenance managers making these decisions.  This means they 
must rely wholly on past experience and a “gut” feel which could become a problem for 
inexperienced maintenance managers.  
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The Research Question 
This research seeks to answer the question:  What effect does “mismatching” 
AFSCs or leaving unit manpower document (UMD) authorized manpower positions 
unfilled in wing aircraft maintenance QA units have on unit- or key wing-level measures? 
The Investigative Questions 
Multiple questions were addressed in order to answer the research question: 
1) Which key unit- and wing-level metrics are most affected by an empty QA 
manning position or an AFSC mismatch? 
2) How effective is a worker when assigned to a QA duty position requiring a 
different UMD-authorized AFSC (how good is the “fit”)? 
3) What is the relationship between QA manning effectiveness and key unit- and 
wing-level metrics?  
Overview of Remaining Chapters  
In this chapter we introduced the problem and provided some background 
information.  In Chapter II, we review the literature examined to gain insight into the QA 
construct along with how the Air Force allocates and assigns manpower to QA flights.  
We also review some of the more important types of metrics found in Air Force 
maintenance organizations.  In Chapter III, we examine the methodology used in the 
study.  In Chapter IV, we create maintenance effectiveness ratings for the 16 bases 
participating in the study and in Chapter V, we apply these Effectiveness ratings to the 
different metric data types.  Lastly, in Chapter VI, we provide conclusions and 
recommendations for future research.   
 
 13
II. Literature Review 
Overview 
 This chapter summarizes the foundational literature this research used.  Numerous 
publications are dedicated to employee performance but few investigate the link between 
Quality Assurance (QA) and employee performance and the ones that do, are oftentimes 
found in accident or incident reports. This research begins with an example of QA’s 
importance in a commercial aviation setting.  We then investigate the Air Force construct 
relating to QA.   
The Commercial Aviation Industry Link 
 On May 11, 1996, ValueJet Flight 592, a DC-9-32 passenger aircraft caught fire 
in-flight and crashed into the Florida Everglades.  The crash killed 110 people and was 
attributed to contract maintenance personnel improperly rendering safe and shipping 
oxygen cylinders in the cargo hold of the aircraft.  The National Transportation Safety 
Board Investigation report cited numerous contributing factors behind the crash: 
The continuing lack of an explicit requirement for the principal maintenance 
inspector of a Part 121 operator to regularly inspect or surveil Part 145 repair 
stations that are performing heavy maintenance for their air carriers is a 
significant deficiency… Improper maintenance activities and false entries pose a 
serious threat to aviation safety and must be curtailed. 
 
This observation is referring to the fact that ValueJet subcontracted their heavy 
maintenance work out to Sabre Tech who performed the maintenance on the oxygen 
canisters for ValueJet.  The report then linked this observation to the need to have the 
right number of people in the right jobs with the following ruling: 
In part because he was responsible for so many operators, the principal 
maintenance inspector assigned to oversee the Sabre Tech facility in Miami was 
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unable to provide affective oversight of the ValueJet heavy maintenance 
operations conducted at the facility. 
 
And finally, the report stated the reason for the crash was: 
ValueJet failed to adequately oversee Sabre Tech and this failure was the cause of 
the accident. (NTSB, 1997). 
 
Understanding the Quality Assurance Construct 
 The purpose of Quality Assurance within the Department of Defense (DoD) was 
initially established in the former DoD Directive 4155.1 which stated: 
The primary purpose of quality assurance is the enforcement of technical criteria 
and requirements governing all materials, data, supplies, and services developed, 
procured, produced, stored, operated, maintained, overhauled, or disposed of by 
or for the DoD. 
 
Although this directive no longer exists, the concept is still valid and quality assurance 
(previously known as quality control), continues to be a critical tool to a manager’s 
ability to keep abreast of the health of their organization.  L. Marvin Johnson, a 
Registered Professional Quality Engineer and author with forty-eight years of experience 
in quality assurance and related fields summed up the concept very succinctly:   
Involved management and discipline is the key to quality.  Evaluations are the 
investigations that determine the extent of an activity’s ability to implement and 
maintain the self controls necessary to administer an effective quality program 
(Johnson, 1990). 
 
“In the U.S. Navy, the process for ensuring adherence to maintenance standards 
involves a quality assurance function designed to perform inspections, audits and quality 
checks on flight equipment and maintenance processes” (OPNAVINST 4790, chap 14).  
The following excerpt overviews the purpose behind the Navy’s QA program: 
QA provides a systematic and efficient method for gathering, analyzing, and 
maintaining information on the quality characteristics of products, the source and 
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nature of defects, and their immediate impact on the current operation. It permits 
decisions to be based on facts rather than intuition or memory and provides 
comparative data which is useful long after the details of the particular time or 
events have passed. The objective of QA is to readily pinpoint problem areas in 
which management can:  
1) Improve the quality, uniformity, and reliability of the total maintenance effort. 
2) Improve the work environment, tools, and equipment used in the maintenance 
effort. 
3) Eliminate unnecessary man-hour and dollar expenditures. 
4) Improve training, work habits, and procedures of maintenance personnel. 
5) Increase the excellence and value of reports and correspondence originated by 
maintenance personnel. 
6) Effectively disseminate technical information. 
7) Establish realistic material and equipment requirements in support of the 
maintenance effort (OPNAVINST 4790.2H, 2001). 
OPNAVINST 4790.2H continues on to describe the Navy QA function as a small group 
of experts who perform quality checks, inspections, and audits in order to collect data 
and monitor trends with the objective of improving processes. 
 
The Link Between Management, Experience, and Quality Results in the Workplace 
 In 1976, the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center conducted a 
study to determine the relationship between the “operational effectiveness of U.S. Navy 
ships and the manning level of selected enlisted ratings. The relationship between 
manning levels and ship performance were investigated on 105 naval ships for the period 
January 1972 to January 1975. Manning levels in the study were expressed as the ratio of 
the number of personnel allocated to the ships to the number authorized and scores 
achieved on final battle problems following refresher training were used as the measure 
of ship performance. Correlation coefficients were computed between manning level and 
performance for various combinations of the independent variables, and were tested for 
statistical significance.  In general, an increase in the number of personnel in the lower 
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pay grades tends to degrade ship performance and an increase in the number of personnel 
in the higher pay grades tends to improve ship performance.”  The study recommended: 
…caution be used in reducing manpower allocated to ships, especially in the 
higher pay grades.  To the extent possible, billets in the higher pay grades should 
not be filled with personnel in lower pay grades. (Holzbach, 1991).   
 
The results of this study underscore the concept that having more personnel with higher 
experience levels (i.e. those in higher pay grades) leads to higher level results.  
In another study conducted by the Naval Surface Weapons Center, a loss control 
system was described which employed management introspect for determining the 
underlying causes of accidents and hazardous situations, and to improve the overall 
effect of accident prevention activities.  Monetary and productive waste and losses, as 
well as accidents, were reduced by using accidents and hazards as indicators to detect 
management failures.  Further, procedures were outlined, together with examples to 
demonstrate how investigation of minor injuries and unsafe conditions can identify the 
management failures which are causing huge hidden losses as well as accidents.  A 
logical method was given to track the primary cause of accidents and hazards back to the 
underlying management failures.  Management failures were placed in general 
categories and summarized to determine and locate problem areas (Fine, 1975).  The 
process described here underscores the critical impact of management’s oversight on safe 
task accomplishment by the workforce.  Aircraft maintenance QA is this oversight. 
A study conducted at the Naval Post Graduate School investigated Naval 
Aviation’s efforts to reduce its mishap rate.  The study highlighted that management 
focus has logically expanded to include maintenance operations. It further stated that 
human error is accepted as a causal factor in at least eighty percent of all mishaps, with 
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maintainer, line, or facility-related factors accounting for one out of five major mishaps 
(Hernandez, 2001).  Again, this underscores the concept that leadership and management 
understands the link between accidents and human frailty.   
The following excerpt from a U.S. Army Safety Center-issued report directly 
supports this claim:  
Accidents during maintenance activities are an indication of operational 
weaknesses that, in combat, would quickly deplete our maintenance capability 
and affect readiness. Maintenance, which keeps the troops on the move, is filled 
with risks. Eliminating or reducing those risks is a key part of carrying out the 
maintenance mission. The key to reducing risks to acceptable levels is training to 
standard and enforcing standards. (USASC, 1991).  
 
This report specifically focuses on the leading causes of accidents in maintenance 
operations and provides general countermeasures for those accidents. 
Furthermore, the universality of the issues behind having the right types of 
manpower and getting desired results must not be overlooked.  In the mid 1980s, the 
Turkish Air Force changed its centralized aircraft maintenance system to the combat 
oriented maintenance system for the F-16 implementation.  They did this to take 
advantage of the new system’s inherent ability to contribute to operational readiness and 
sustainability and to allow more efficient management of manpower resources.  This was 
because they understood that efficient management of manpower becomes even more 
critical as a new program is implemented and a new weapon system becomes operational, 
and furthermore that enhanced supportability depends upon efficient and effective 
resource allocation.  The research specifically addressed the impact of reliability and 
maintainability on maintenance manpower requirements and mission effectiveness 
(Akpinar, 1986).  
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How the Air Force Programs and Allocates Manpower to Units  
Although this study is not meant to analyze how manpower is “earned” by the 
various QA units in ACC, having a basic working knowledge of the AF manpower 
system is essential to accepting one of the foundational assumptions that the study is 
based on.  Specifically, this study assumes that each QA unit’s UMD consists of the 
correct number of manpower authorizations required for the mission they are tasked to 
perform.  What follows is a brief overview of the manpower determination process (see 
Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Simplified Block Diagram Tracing Development of a Valid UMD 
At the highest level, the AF Directorate of Manpower, Organization and Quality, 
Program Development Division (HQ USAF/XPMP) allocates programmed manpower 
resources to the commands directing implementation of approved programs.  Next, each 
command translates these manpower resources into manpower authorizations by 
notifying the respective Manpower Office.  The local Manpower Office notifies the unit 
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and the unit is responsible to input the data to the manpower office to update the Unit 
Manpower Document (UMD) by organization, AFSC, grade, and program element code.  
The Manpower and Organization Office then provides this detailed identification to the 
respective organization and the personnel community (AFI 38-204). 
Basis for UMDs  
An Air Force Manpower Standard (AFMS) is the basis for all AF manpower 
requirements and AF manpower is based on man-hour requirements.  Man-hour 
requirements are further determined in one of three ways, all of which are rooted in a 
systematic scientific process.  The two most often used for Air Combat Command (ACC) 
aircraft maintenance/munitions units are the Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) and the 
conventional manpower standard.  As a side note, each ACC base’s Manpower Office is 
responsible for conducting each of these manpower determinant processes with the 
approval authority running from AFMA to AF/XPMO an finally to AF/DPM as final 
approval authority.  The first determinant process uses the LCOM. 
The LCOM is a discrete-event computer simulation used to model manpower and 
other logistical requirements by considering employment of different resources to help 
the user decide the best mix to support a given requirement.  Because LCOM studies can 
identify peacetime and wartime requirements, these studies provide a more defensible 
budget position and allow for effective use of available resources (AFI 38-208, Vol 3, 
para 1).  The second manpower requirements development process is the conventional 
manpower standard.  The conventional manpower standard is a formula based on aircraft 
type and mission (e.g. every aircraft squadron equipped with 24, F-15Cs tasked with an 
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air superiority mission have the same number of crew chiefs, avionics technicians, line 
expeditors, etc based on the standard).  A third and final process to develop manpower 
requirements is provided for in AFI 38-210, para 2.6.  The instruction states:   
Commands may determine aircraft maintenance manpower requirements using 
aircraft specific maintenance man-hour per flying hour (MMH/FH) factors when 
more rigorous methods (conventional manpower standards or Logistics 
Composite Model manpower determinants) are not available (AFI 38-210, para 
2.6). 
 
Although the MMH/FH process is also computationally grounded, it is not as 
rigorous as the two prior methods.  The MMH/FH technique uses basic standard 
weighted formulas for different sub-processes within the AF function being examined 
and is broken down by Productive Manning, Addenda (Survival Shop, Aerospace Ground 
Equipment, etc), and Additives (Munitions, Electronic Countermeasures Pods, etc.).  
Again, this is not the preferred process for determining manpower requirements (AFI 38-
210, para 2.6).  However, whichever of the three processes is used, they all result in a 
manpower determinant, and this determinant may ultimately result in creation of a UMD.  
Like all other USAF UMDs, Air Combat Command QA UMDs were developed using 
one of these three processes (see Table 2 for an example of a UMD).     
 
 
Table 2 – Unit Manning Document (UMD) Excerpt 
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Printed On Unit Manpower Document Query: MXG
1/1/2005 XXXXX
OSC: MXQ - QUALITY ASSURANCE FAC: 12345 - QUALITY ASSURANCE
POS AFSC and TITLE SEI GRD RGR PEC
1C 01234567C ACFT MAINTENANCE 021A3 CAPT MAJOR AN
1C 01234567C AIRCRAFT MGR 2A300 CMSGT CMSGT AN
1C 01234567C AEROSPACE MAI CRFTM 2A571 TSGT TSGT AN
1C 01234567C AEROSPC PRP CRFTMN 2A671A TSGT TSGT AN
1C 01234567C NUCLEAR WEP CRFT 2W271 TSGT TSGT AN
1C 01234567C ACFT ARM SYS JYMN 2W151 SSGT SSGT AN
1C 01234567C NUCLEAR WEP JYMN 2W251 SSGT SSGT AN
1C 01234567C NUCLEAR WEP JYMN 2W251 SSGT SSGT AN
1C 01234567C INFORMATION JYMN 3A051 SSGT SSGT AN
OSC: MXQ - QUALITY ASSURANCE
FAC: 12345 - QUALITY ASSURANCE
 
OSC: MXQI - INSPECTION FAC: 12345- QUALITY ASSURANCE
POS AFSC and TITLE SEI GRD RGR PEC
1C 01234567C AEROSPACE MAI SUPT 2A590 SMSGT SMSGT AN
1C 01234567C AEROSPACE MAI SUPT 2A590 SMSGT SMSGT AN
1C 01234567C AEROSPC PRP CRFTMN 2A671A MSGT MSGT AN
1C 01234567C INTG AVN SYS/INS CFM 2A573B TSGT TSGT AN
1C 01234567C INTG AVN SYS EW CFTM 2A573C TSGT TSGT AN
1C 01234567C AERO GR EQUIP CRFT 2A672 TSGT MSGT AN
1C 01234567C ACF EL/ENV SYS CRFT 2A676 TSGT TSGT AN
1C 01234567C MSL/SPC SY MA CRFT 2M071 TSGT TSGT AN
1C 01234567C AEROSPACE MAI JYMN 2A551K SSGT TSGT AN
1C 01234567C ACFT HYDR SYS JYMN 2A655 SSGT SSGT AN
1C 01234567C ACFT STRC MAIN JYMN 2A753 SSGT SSGT AN
1C 01234567C MUNITIONS SYS JYMN 2W051 SSGT SSGT AN
1C 01234567C ACFT ARM SYS JYMN 2W151 SSGT SSGT AN
OSC: MXQI - INSPECTION
FAC: 21A100 - QUALITY ASSURANCE
 
 
Directives Supporting the Requirement for AF Maintenance QA 
The QA UMD is the result of a manpower determination.  As such, the UMD is 
the legal authorization to hire and pay for all personnel assigned to the QA flight, to 
include overhead positions (management and supervision), all inspector positions, the AF 
Repair Enhancement shop, and the administrative function.  To fully understand the 
requirements that the UMD was created to support, we review the specific functions that 
QA personnel are required to perform.   
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The basic requirement for a QA function is spelled out in AFI 21-101 (para 10.2): 
• Responsible to the Maintenance Group (MXG) Commander to perform as the 
primary technical advisory agency for maintenance, assisting work center 
supervisors  
  
The following is the remaining list of other QA responsibilities (AFI 21-101, para 10.2): 
 
• Implements and administers the Maintenance Standardization and Evaluation 
Program (MSEP) 
• Manages the Product Improvement Program (PIP) 
• Manages the Deficiency Reporting (DR) Program 
• Manages the Product Improvement Working Group (PWIG) 
• Manages the Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Working Group 
• Manages the Technical Order Distribution Office (TODO) 
• Manages the One-Time Inspections (OTI) Program 
• Manages the Functional Check Flight (FCF) Program  
• Manages the Weight and Balance (W&B) Program 
• Manages the Hot Refuel Program (Hotpits) 
• Manages the Aircraft and Equipment Impoundment Program 
• Reviews aircraft aborts, in-flight emergencies (IFE), and other incidents as 
required using MIS or MAJCOM forms 
• Assists Maintenance Operations Flight (MOF) Plans Scheduling and 
Documentation (PS&D) and the Munitions Flight with the Configuration 
Management Program 
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• Assists MOF PS&D with the Time Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) program  
• Implements the unit chafing awareness program 
• QA inspectors augment weapons loading inspection/evaluations at the request of 
Weapons Standardization Section 
• QA uses their technical expertise to assist the MXG to arrive at informed 
decisions when coordinating with higher headquarters, AF Materiel Command, 
Defense Contract Maintenance Agency, and other outside agencies 
• Evaluates unit maintenance management procedures, including locally developed 
forms, publications, operating instructions, etc, for accuracy, intent, and necessity 
• Ensures management/evaluation of Special Programs listed in AFI 21-101, 
Chapter 18 as assigned by the MXG Commander (32 Special Programs listed) 
• Manages the Air Force Repair Enhancement Program (AFREP)  
 
Now that we have described the QA construct, we investigate the literature on 
maintenance metrics. 
Examining Maintenance-Related Metrics 
 In the USAF Maintenance Metrics Handbook forward section, Brigadier General 
Terry Gabreski, Director of Logistics for the Air Force Material Command, said: 
Metrics are critical tools to be used by maintenance managers to gauge an 
organization’s effectiveness and efficiency.  In fact they are roadmaps that let you 
determine where you’ve been, where you are going, and how (or if) you are going 
to get there (AFLMA, 2002).     
 
The handbook further explained that metrics are not just charts and numbers to be looked 
at, but are rather tools for fixing problems.  Since the overarching objective of AF 
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maintenance is to maintain aerospace equipment in a safe, serviceable, and ready 
condition to meet mission needs, maintenance management metrics serve this objective 
(AFI 21-101, para 10.1).  The paragraph further states that metrics shall be used at all 
levels of command to drive improved performance and adhere to well established 
guidelines and that: 
• Metrics must be accurate and useful for decision-making 
• Metrics must be consistent and clearly linked to goals/standards 
• Metrics must be clearly understood and communicated 
• Metrics must be based on a measurable, well-defined process 
Metrics -- Leading and Lagging 
The instruction also delineated that primary maintenance metrics are grouped into 
various categories with the two more important categories being “leading” and “lagging” 
indicators.  The leading indicators show a problem first because they directly impact 
maintenance’s capability to provide resources to execute the mission, whereas lagging 
indicators follow, and show firmly established trends.  In the instruction, those 
maintenance metrics that the Air Force considers as primary, are listed in alphabetical 
order along with relevant formulas and examples (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3).   We 
address these formulas again in Chapter V.  
The Air Combat Command Flying Wing Structure 
An average Air Combat Command (ACC) flying wing contains four groups: a 
Medical Group (Primary Care, Emergency, Operations, Mobility, Flight Medicine, etc); a 
Support Group (Security Forces, Civil Engineer, Base Personnel Office, etc.); an 
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Operations Group (pilots, Life Support, Air Space Scheduling, Air Traffic Control, 
Weather, Flight Records, Intelligence, Airfield Operations, etc.); and a Maintenance 
Group (Component Maintenance, Equipment Maintenance, Maintenance Scheduling, 
Maintenance Analysis, Quality Assurance, Munitions, End-of Runway, Maintenance 
Support, etc.).   As a further drill-down, we will first examine the functional hierarchy 
Maintenance Group and then the Quality Assurance sub-function.   
The Air Force Maintenance Group 
In line with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 21-101, the Maintenance Group is primarily 
responsible for performing organizational level (on-equipment) and intermediate level 
(back shop, off-equipment) maintenance.  This effort requires many personnel, 
performing a multitude of diverse and specialized tasks (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8 – Maintenance Group Functional Diagram 
 
 
More specifically, the Maintenance Group Commander is “responsible for 
aerospace equipment maintenance required to ensure balance between sortie production 
and fleet management” (AFI 21-101, paragraph 2.3).  Although this may sound simplistic 
and straightforward, it is not.  In fact, this research uncovered that a typical ACC 
Maintenance Group is comprised of between 2,500 and 3,500 maintenance personnel.  
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Effectively utilizing this number of diverse personnel in itself can be a daunting 
leadership and management challenge but add to this the high-stress and fast-paced 
element that comes with the daily training and combat operations, and the criticality 
factors increase exponentially.  This is where the Maintenance Group Commander needs 
help and this help comes in the form of a highly specialized and mature workforce of 
maintenance personnel who are hand-picked to form the Maintenance group Quality 
Assurance Flight.  According to AFI 21-101, paragraph 10.1: 
The combined efforts of quality assurance personnel, maintenance leaders, and 
technicians are necessary to ensure high-quality maintenance production and 
equipment reliability.  Maintenance leaders are responsible for safety of flight, 
safety of equipment operation, and quality maintenance production.  The quality 
assurance staff evaluates the quality of maintained accomplished in the 
maintenance organization.  Quality assurance personnel are not an extension of 
the work force.  Quality assurance serves as the primary technical advisory 
agency in the maintenance organization, helping production supervisors and the 
maintenance group commander resolve quality problems. The evaluation and 
analysis of deficiencies and problem areas are key functions of quality assurance.  
This activity identifies underlying causes of poor quality in the maintenance 
production effort.  By finding causes of problems and recommending corrective 
actions to supervisors, quality assurance can significantly affect the quality of 
maintenance within the maintenance complex.   
 
It is clear from the governing direction how highly regarded the aircraft 
maintenance quality assurance function is.  Now, taking into account the huge number of 
activities and personnel that need this critical quality assurance oversight, it would seem 
to require a flight of hundreds to perform this job; however, this is not the reality.  In fact, 
the average ACC quality assurance flight contains 25 to 30 personnel including overhead.  
This equates to an approximate 100-to-1 ratio of maintainers to “assigned” QA inspectors 
within a typical aircraft wing’s Maintenance Group (this includes both flight line, 
maintenance shops, and munitions storage area personnel.  It further indicates a fully-
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staffed QA shop with no one on leave, deployed, in training, etc).  Furthermore, when the 
QA shop’s management and administrative overhead is factored out and actual shift-
manning is broken down, an effectively scheduled QA shop might be able to muster five 
inspectors per 10-hour work shift.  Coupled to this is the fact that these “golden five” are 
charged with a multitude of duties including providing maintenance oversight, and 
performing safety and technical investigations along with task certification for trainees in 
upgrade status.  They perform these duties all while covering day-to-day contracted task 
evaluations.  Because of this low ratio of critical QA troops to maintenance personnel, it 
is absolutely essential that the “right” people be assigned. 
Chapter Overview and Conclusion 
In this chapter we provided an overview of the relevant literature.  In Chapter III, 
we examine the methodology used in the study. 
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III.  Methodology 
Overview 
 In this chapter, we present the methodology followed.  We first present the 
research question and investigative questions.   
 The Research Question 
This research seeks to answer the question:  What effect does mismatching Air 
Force Specialty Codes (AFSC) or leaving unit manpower document (UMD) authorized 
manpower positions unfilled in aircraft maintenance QA units have on key unit- and/or 
wing-level measures? 
The Investigative Questions 
Multiple questions were addressed in order to answer the research question: 
1) Which key unit- and wing-level metrics are most affected by an empty QA 
manning position or a mismatch? 
2) What is the effectiveness of a person without the UMD-designated AFSC when 
performing the QA duties of another AFSC (how good is the “fit”)? 
3) What is the relationship between QA manning effectiveness and key unit- and 
wing-level metrics?  
Analytical Model 
This study was completed in four distinct phases directly linked to the three 
investigative questions (see Figure 9).  Phase-One was comprised of a two-part Delphi 
survey sent out to senior aircraft maintenance managers, leaders, and subject matter 
experts across Air Combat Command (ACC) aircraft/maintenance units.  In this phase, 
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key maintenance metrics were identified and a manning effectiveness matrix was 
constructed.  Phase-Two of the study consisted of acquiring all ACC aircraft flying units’ 
historical manning and applying the manning effectiveness matrix to this data.  In Phase-
Three, the subject aircraft flying units’ key unit- and wing-level metrics were compiled 
and statistically regressed against the calculated QA manning effectiveness rates.  We 
then analyzed the regression analysis results in Phase-Four in order to develop potential 
mitigating strategies for use by mid-level Air Force aircraft/munitions maintenance 
managers.  Using the data, we also performed a sample benefit-cost analysis.  The four 
phases are examined in detail in chapters III through V, but first we will overview the 
primary research tool used to garner information to complete Phase One of the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Flow Diagram of Four-Phase Research Process 
The Delphi Technique 
The Delphi technique was chosen for Phase-One due to its relative strength of 
application compared to the requirements of the study.  In essence, the objective of 
Phase-One of the study was to develop a useful worker effectiveness rating scale for a 
person with a particular skill set when performing the duties of a job different from what 
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they are specifically trained for and to elicit the metrics.  The Delphi technique provided 
a natural fit to gain this type of knowledge.   
Delphi Technique – Some Uses   
According to Linstone, Harold A. and Murray Turoff, the Delphi technique is 
often used to combine and refine the opinions of a heterogeneous group of experts in 
order to establish a judgment based on merging of the information collectively available 
to the experts (see Figure 10).  Further, a Delphi can be characterized as a method for 
structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a 
group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem.  The Delphi Method is 
a group-making technique developed as part of an Air Force-sponsored RAND 
Corporation study in the early 1950’s.  The Delphi Method seeks to achieve consensus 
among group members through a series of questionnaires.  The questionnaires are 
answered anonymously and individually by each member of the group.  The answers are 
summarized and sent back to the group members along with the next questionnaire.  The 
process is repeated until a group consensus is reached within a bounds determined a 
priori.  This usually only takes two iterations, but can sometimes take as many as six 
rounds before a consensus is reached (Linstone, Harold A. and Murray Turoff, ed, 1975).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – Delphi Method Flow Diagram  
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The Delphi Technique has proven to have many uses among which are: 
1) Gathering current and historical data not accurately known or available 
2) Examining the significance of historical events  
3) Evaluating possible budget allocations 
4) Exploring urban and regional planning options 
5) Planning university campus and curriculum development 
6) Putting together the structure of a model 
7) Delineating the pro and cons associated with potential policy options 
8) Developing casual relationships in complex economics or social phenomena 
9) Distinguishing and clarifying real and perceived human motivations 
10) Exposing priorities of personal values, social goals” (Turoff and Linstone, 1975) 
 
This study takes advantage of ‘uses 1, 6, 8 and 10’ from the preceding list. 
 
Delphi Technique – Properties Supporting Its Use    
It is not the explicit nature of the applications which determines the 
appropriateness of utilizing Delphi; it is the particular circumstances surrounding the 
necessarily associated group communication process: Who is it that should communicate 
about the problem, what alternative mechanisms are available for that communication, 
and what can we expect to obtain with these alternatives?  When these questions are 
addressed, one can decide if the Delphi is the desirable choice.  Usually one or more of 
the following properties of the application leads to the need for employing Delphi: 
1) The problem does not lend itself to precise analytical techniques but can benefit 
from subjective judgment on a collective basis. 
2) The individuals needed to contribute to the examination of a broad or complex 
problem have no history of adequate communication and may represent diverse 
backgrounds with respect to experience or expertise. 
3) More individuals are needed that can effectively interact in a face-to-face 
exchange. 
4) Time and cost make frequent group meetings infeasible. 
5) The efficiency of face-to-face meetings can be increased by a supplemental group 
communication process. 
6) Disagreements among individuals are so severe or politically unpalatable that the 
communication process must be refereed or anonymity assured. 
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7) The heterogeneity of the participants must be preserved to assured validity of the 
results i.e. avoidance of domination by quantity or by strength of personality 
(bandwagon effect) (Turoff and Linstone, 1975). 
 
This study encompasses all of the preceding Delphi technique properties except #6.   
Delphi Technique – Potential Problems When Using    
There are potential problems with utilizing the Delphi Technique which must be 
mitigated for, if the process is expected to be effective.  Some of these are: 
1) Imposing the monitor’s views and preconceptions upon the respondent group by 
over specifying the structure of the Delphi and not allowing for the contribution 
of other perspectives related to the problem. 
2) Assuming that the Delphi can be a surrogate for all other human communications 
in a given situation. 
3) Poor techniques of summarizing and preventing the group response and ensuring 
common interpretations of the evaluation scales utilized in the exercise. 
4) Ignoring and not exploring disagreements, so that the discouraged dissenters 
drop out and an artificial consensus is generated. 
5) Underestimating the demanding nature of the Delphi and the fact that the 
respondents should be recognized as consultants and properly compensated for 
their time if the Delphi is not an integral part of their job function (Turoff and 
Linstone, 1975). 
 
All of these potential problems were applicable to Phase-One of this study.   
Delphi Technique – How to Choose a Good Respondent Group    
A typical concern when performing the Delphi Technique is how to choose a 
good respondent group in both composition and in number.  Not only should the 
respondents be volunteers but they should also be subject matter experts who will be able 
to participate in the entire Delphi process.  This was a problem during this study and it 
will be discussed along with mitigating strategies undertaken to account for this.  But, the 
basic question remains: Just how many respondents does it take to make a good 
respondent group?  Experiments by Brockhoff (1975) suggest that under ideal 
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circumstances, groups as small as four can perform well (Dalkey, 1969).  However, like 
in most research studies, more data is better.  This study is no exception.   
To determine the correct group size for our Delphi panel, we looked to the 1969 
study performed for the USAF by the RAND Corporation, the creator of the Delphi 
Method.  In the study, RAND performed an experiment designed to measure the 
correlation between the effect of group size and average group error.  The results of this 
experiment are charted in Figure 11 which clearly shows that the mean accuracy of a 
group response for a large set of experimentally derived answers to factual questions, 
increases as group size increases (Dalkey, 1969).  
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Figure 11 – Effect of Group Size on Error (Dalkey, 1969) 
 
 
 Specifically, with smaller group sizes of between one and seven persons, the 
average group error rate behaves exponentially then begins to flatten out as the group size 
approaches 15.  Also according to the RAND report, reliability of responses increases on 
a linear path as the group size increases from three to 11 panelists (see Figure 12).  
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Figure 12 – Effect of Group Size on Reliability (Dalkey, 1969) 
 
 
Furthermore, according to Ludwid, the majority of Delphi studies have used 
between 15 and 20 panelists, but Dalkey, Rourke, Lewis, and Snyder (1972) reported a 
definite and monolithic increase in group response approaching a correlation coefficient 
of 0.9 with a group size of 13 respondents (Ludwid, 1997).  Thus, this empirical data 
gives us an initial target number of qualified panelists for Phase-One of the study.  Based 
on this research, we set a minimum requirement of a 2:1 ratio of qualified group members 
to actual units under study.  This gave us a required starting size of 24 panelists (14 ACC 
units x 2) which we easily surpassed with 45 actual volunteers at the beginning of the 
study.  This correlated well with Clayton’s rule-of-thumb that 15-30 people is an 
adequate panel size (Clayton, 1997).  At the end of this chapter we will address some 
problems associated with self-reports in the Scope and Limitations section.  We will now 
examine Phase-One of our methodology. 
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Phase-One of the Study 
Obtaining the ACC Aircraft QA AFSC List of Manpower Positions 
Phase-One began with the researcher contacting ACC/LGQ which is the 
headquarters function for ACC quality assurance units.  Specifically, the ACC/LGQ 
superintendent provided two spreadsheets containing the most current list of QA and 
Maintenance Group leadership contacts for all ACC aircraft flying units (QA flight 
commanders, chiefs, and superintendents, and maintenance group chiefs).  We used this 
list to initiate contact with each of the units to ask them if they would provide us a list of 
all of their Unit Manning Document (UMD) authorized manpower positions for their 
maintenance QA flight.  Furthermore, to help standardize the responses, we then created 
and sent each of the units a spreadsheet for them to fill in and send back their UMD-
authorized manning. 
Each of the units subsequently provided the file that contained all of their UMD-
authorized manpower positions broken down to the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) 
skill-level and shred-out detail (i.e. the C in AFSC 2A551C indicates a B-52 technician).  
These original unit UMDs were then aggregated by AFSC, and skill level to develop a 
master ACC aircraft quality assurance AFSC list.  The resultant list contained 65 
different AFSCs delineated by skill-level and shred out that would be used to create a 
square matrix for the next sub-phase of the study.  However, a list this large would result 
in a survey questionnaire with 4,225 AFSC effectiveness combinations for the research 
respondents to subjectively grade (652 = 4,225).  A survey this large was deemed 
intractable (see Table 3).   
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Table 3 – Initial ACC Aircraft QA AFSC List of Manpower Positions 
AFSC AFS TITLE AFSC AFS TITLE
 2A551L AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN 2A573A INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/COM CRAFTSMAN
 2A553A INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/COM JOURNEYMAN 2A573B INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/INS CRAFTSMAN
 2A571 AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN 2A573C INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS ELECTRONIC WARFARE CRAFTSMAN
 2A571L AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN 2A590 AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT
 2A573 INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN 2A651A AEROSPACE PROPULSION JOURNEYMAN
 2A600 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS MANAGER 2A651B AEROSPACE PROPULSION JOURNEYMAN
 2A651A AEROSPACE PROPULSION JOURNEYMAN 2A652 AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIPMENT JOURNEYMAN
 2A655 AIRCRAFT HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN 2A654 AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
 2A671A AEROSPACE PROPULSION CRAFTSMAN 2A655 AIRCRAFT HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
 2A676 AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM CRAFTSMAN 2A656 AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
 2A691 AEROSPACE PROPULSION SUPERINTENDENT 2A671A ENGINE MANAGER
021A3 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICER 2A671B AEROSPACE PROPULSION CRAFTSMAN
021B3 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICER 2A672 AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIPMENT CRAFTSMAN
2A051A AVIONICS TEST STATION AND COMPUTER JOURNEYMAN 2A673 AIRCRAFT EGRESS SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
2A071A AVIONICS TEST STATION & COMPUTER CRAFTSMAN 2A674 AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
2A071D AVIONICS TEST STATION & COMPUTER CRAFTSMAN 2A675 AIRCRAFT HYDRAULICS SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
2A300 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SUPERINTENDENT 2A676 AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
2A351A A10/F15/U2 AVIONICS ATTACK JOURNEYMAN 2A690 AEROSPACE SYSTEMS SUPERINTENDENT
2A352 A10/F15/U2 AVIONICS ATTACK JOURNEYMAN 2A753 AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN
2A353A TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE F-15 JOURNEYMAN 2A754 SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT JOURNEYMAN
2A353B TACTICAL MAINTENANCE F-16/F-117 JOURNEYMAN 2A773 AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN
2A353J TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE GENERAL JOURNEYMAN 2A774 SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT CRAFTSMAN
2A371 A10/F15/U2 AVIONICS CRAFTSMAN 2E171 SATELLITE, WIDEBAND, & TELEMETRY SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
2A372 F16/F117/R21/CV22 AVIONICS CRAFTSMAN 2E271 COMPUTER NETWORK S&C SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
2A373 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN 2M071 MISSILE/SPC SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN
2A373A TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN 2W051 MUNITIONS SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
2A373B TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN 2W071 MUNITIONS SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
2A390 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SUPERINTENDENT 2W151 AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
2A551J AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN 2W171 AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYSTEMS CRAFTSMAN
2A551K AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN 2W251 NUCLEAR WEAPONS JOURNEYMAN
2A553B INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/INS JOURNEYMAN 2W271 NUCLEAR WEAPONS CRAFTSMAN
2A553C INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/ELECTRONIC WARFARE JOURNEYMAN 3A051 INFORMATION SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN
2A572 HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE CRAFTSMAN
 
 
Functionally Shaping the ACC Aircraft QA AFSC List of Manpower Positions 
 To functionally shape the AFSC effectiveness grading matrix, we needed to pare 
down the candidate list of AFSCs to a more manageable number.  First, all AFSCs not 
relevant to the QA inspection process (functional check flight pilot, maintenance officer, 
and administrative positions) were eliminated.  We then aggregated all AFSCs 
functionally by combining the five- and seven-skill levels (Technician and Craftsman 
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respectively) for each AFS (AF Specialty) and nine- and zero-skill level (Superintendent 
and Chief Master Sergeant Chief Enlisted Manager Code) within each AFS.  This 
decreased the master ACC aircraft QA AFSC list to 47 different AFSCs which equated to 
2,209 individual AFSC effectiveness combinations for the first sub-phase (472 = 2,209).  
This was also determined to be unmanageable.  To further decrease the number of AFSCs 
on the list, AFSC shredouts (identifies special weapons systems or skills required for a 
position) were eliminated to standardize AFSCs.  This last cut created a master ACC 
aircraft quality assurance AFSC list of 24 different AFSCs for a sub-phase count of 570 
individual AFSC effectiveness combinations (242 = 570).  Although still a large number, 
we determined that any further aggregation would result in too broad of categories to 
effectively work with (see Table 4).     
Table 4 – Resultant ACC Aircraft QA AFSC List of Manpower Positions 
AFSC AFS TITLE
2A0X1 AVIONICS TEST STATION AND COMPUTER JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A3X0 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SUPERINTENDENT
2A3X1 A10/F15/U2 AVIONICS ATTACK JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A3X2 A10/F15/U2 AVIONICS ATTACK JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A3X3 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE F-15 JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A590 MAINTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT (NON-TACTICAL AIRCRAFT)
2A5X1 AEROSPACE MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A5X2 HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A5X3 INTEGRATED AVIONICS SYSTEMS/INS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A6X0 AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS MANAGER
2A6X1 AEROSPACE PROPULSION JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A6X2 AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIPMENT JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A6X3 AIRCRAFT EGRESS SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A6X4 AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A6X5 AIRCRAFT HYDRAULICS SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A6X6 AIRCRAFT ELECTRICAL/ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A7X3 AIRCRAFT STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2A7X4 SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2E1X1 SATELLITE, WIDEBAND, & TELEMETRY SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2E2X1 COMPUTER NETWORK S&C SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2M0X1 MISSILE/SPC SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2W0X1 MUNITIONS SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2W1X1 AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT SYSTEMS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN
2W2X1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS JOURNEYMAN/CRAFTSMAN  
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The derived master ACC aircraft maintenance QA AFSC list was then sent to 
each of the ACC aircraft maintenance QA units to validate that it did in fact contain all of 
their authorized AFSCs at the aggregate level.  All ACC aircraft QA units responded 
affirmatively and we determined the master list to be acceptable.  This ACC aircraft QA 
AFSC master list containing the 24 aggregated AFSCs was then used to develop a cross-
combination grading matrix and a web-based survey (see Appendix A).  
Composing the Delphi Panel of Experts 
To gain a list of potential survey respondents with the required background to 
participate as qualified members of the Delphi Panel of Experts, a list of QA and 
maintenance group leaders obtained from ACC/LGQ was used as a seed to send out the 
request for volunteers.  The rationale for this is that these personnel, due to their position, 
were considered good candidates as subject matter experts on the aircraft maintenance 
and quality assurance functions under study.  The researcher then sent out a focused call 
to each of these personnel via e-mail asking for volunteers.   
To further ensure a representative view across all ACC aircraft maintenance units, 
a basic objective was set to attain a minimum of two senior leaders from each unit to 
participate on the Delphi panel of experts.  Also, each of the potential respondents was 
vetted to ensure they possessed a minimum of six years of experience in the aircraft 
maintenance field.  Respondents who did not meet this requirement were not used on the 
Delphi panel of experts for the two-part surveys.  The demographics of the volunteers 
who were ultimately accepted for the panel appear in Table 5. 
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Table 5 – Delphi Panel of Experts Demographic Data – Initial List 
Rank Number in Rank 
Average Number Years 
Aircraft/Munitions Maintenance 
Experience 
Lt Colonel 2 22 
Major 2 12 
Captain 3 9 
CMSgt 28 24 
SMSgt 10 18 
In
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ro
up
 
Totals 45 21.0 
 
 
The Two-Part Survey Using the DELPH Technique 
Survey, Part-1 
A two-part, web-based survey was developed to send out to the Delphi panel of 
experts.  The specific objective in Survey, Part-1, was to answer the Investigative 
Question: “Which key unit- and wing-level metrics are most affected by an empty QA 
manning position or a mismatch?”  It was designed to elicit a cognitive view from experts 
in the aircraft maintenance field on how they saw the impact that they perceived the 
aircraft/munitions quality assurance function had on a candidate list of the more visible 
wing- and unit-level metrics as determined by the researcher.  Survey, Part-1’s 
instructions asked the respondents to rate each of fifteen candidate metrics on a six-point 
LIKERT scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree (see Table 6 and Appendix A).  
The respondents were also encouraged to provide additional metrics they felt were 
impacted by the performance of the quality assurance function.  Each question also 
included an area for the respondents to comment on their ratings if they so desired. 
It should be noted that we chose to use a six-point LIKERT scale without a neutral option 
in order to eliminate fence-sitting and to “force” an answer.  Additionally, we performed 
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only one round of Survey, Part-1 because the basic intent of this sub-phase was to gain a 
candidate list of metrics to use in Phase-Three of the study.  Both of these decisions 
supported this objective.       
Table 6 – Survey, Part-1 Rating Scale 
Rating % Effect
1 0%
2 20%
3 40%
4 60%
5 80%
6 100%
Rating Scale
Descriptor
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Somewhat Agree
Agree
Strongly Agree  
 
As a quality control measure and to uncover problems and/or inconsistencies, the 
survey instrument was first Beta-tested on seven Air Force Institute of Technology 
students who possessed extensive aircraft maintenance experience (greater than six years 
each).  Once all reported problems were corrected, the survey instrument was vetted once 
again through the thesis committee where two more problems were highlighted and 
subsequently corrected.  Afterward, the instrument was released to the Air Force Institute 
of Technology’s production server and then the web link was sent out to the Delphi 
panelists.  Table 7 contains demographic data for the Survey, Part-1 respondents.  Table 8 
is a combined list of metrics submitted by the Delphi panel while Appendixes BU and 
BV show response values along with validation determinations for each metric. 
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Table 7 – Survey, Part-2 ROUND ONE Panel of Experts Demographic Data 
Rank Number 
Average Number Years 
Aircraft/Munitions Maintenance 
Experience 
Lt Colonel 1 18 
Major 2 12 
Captain 2 9 
CMSgt 22 22.6 
SMSgt 7 18 S
ur
ve
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t -
1 
Totals 34 20.1 
 
Table 8 – Survey, Part-1 Metrics Validated / Not Validated 
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Survey, Part-2 – ROUND ONE 
Survey, Part-2 was created to answer the Investigative Question: “What is the 
effectiveness of a person without the UMD-designated AFSC when performing the QA 
duties of another AFSC (how good is the ‘fit’)?”  For ROUND ONE of Survey, Part-2, a 
web-based instrument was developed and sent out to all Delphi Panel of Experts 
members.  It consisted of a 28-page survey containing one introduction page, one 
instructions page, one demographics page, 24 survey sheets, and one closure page.  The 
heart of Survey, Part-2 was the 24 AFSC effectiveness grading sheets.   
As a quality control measure and to uncover problems and/or inconsistencies, the 
survey instrument was first Beta-tested on seven Air Force Institute of Technology 
students who possessed extensive aircraft maintenance experience (i.e. greater than six 
years each).   Once all reported problems were corrected, the survey instrument was 
vetted once again through the thesis committee where four more problems were 
highlighted and subsequently corrected.  The instrument was then released to the Air 
Force Institute of Technology’s production server and afterward the link was sent out to 
the Delphi panel of experts.   
Each Delphi panelist was asked to systematically rate, on a scale of one to five 
(correlating to a scale of 0 to 100 percent in 20-point increments), how effective a person 
possessing the AFSC in each row appearing down the left column on each page could be 
expected to perform the duties and tasks of the QA manning position listed on the top of 
each sheet.  It was expressly explained in the instructions to the respondents that they 
were to rate the effectiveness of an average person possessing each designated AFSC 
performing QA duties, not the normal flight line or back shop maintenance tasks 
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performed by technicians.  Once all ROUND ONE responses were received from the 
panel members, they were compiled, aggregated, and statistically averaged.   
Because the Delphi panel consisted of high-ranking and critically-placed 
maintainers and leaders, their ability to dedicate two to three hours to a survey became a 
problem for many of them and thus, Survey, Part-2 ROUND ONE took over three 
months to complete.  Furthermore, although a comments section was provided for on this 
part of the web-based survey, there were no comments provided from the panel.  Based 
on e-mail and phone responses from panelists, it was concluded that this was caused by 
two phenomena: the first cause for a lack of comments on ROUND ONE was that the 
survey fostered this type of response due to its length (requiring 570 individual 
responses) even though the survey enabled the panel member to stop and start again later 
where they left off.  The second causal factor for getting no comments back was that the 
questions asked for the respondents to rate manning effectiveness based on experience.  
With the high caliber of individuals on the panel and the straightforwardness of the 
survey instrument, it is understandable that the panelists determined that they did not 
need to defend an opinion in the absence of dissent (i.e. there were no dissenting views in 
Survey, Part-2 ROUND ONE).  Table 9 contains a snapshot of the demographics of the 
Survey, Part-2 ROUND ONE respondents. 
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Table 9 – Survey, Part-2 ROUND ONE Panel of Experts Demographic Data 
Rank Number 
Average Number Years 
Aircraft/Munitions Maintenance 
Experience 
Lt Colonel 2 22 
Major 2 12 
Captain 2 9 
CMSgt 19 24 
SMSgt 7 18 
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Totals 32 20.9 
 
 
However, due to the extensive amount of time required to accomplish Survey, 
Part-2 ROUND ONE, it was obvious that Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO needed to be 
structured in a more streamlined fashion.  Using the coefficient of variation (CV) 
discriminator method gave us the ability to compare the variation of two or more 
different variables and provides a standardized view of variability across all 570 
responses to gain a better understanding of the variability present in the data.  The 
following is the formula for computing the population coefficient of variation:  
σPopulationCV=
μ
     (note: σ = standard deviation; µ = mean).   
CV thresholds between 0 and 1.0 were iteratively applied to all 570 panel mean 
data responses in an attempt to come up with a test factor that would illuminate the “Fail” 
responses (indicating a lack of agreement among the experts) that would be needed to be 
addressed by the panel in ROUND TWO due to variability present in the responses.  
However, even at the lowest CV test factor, there were still over 500 individual responses 
which were a “fail”.  After carefully analyzing the data, a CV factor of 0.29 was 
determined as an appropriate “trip-wire” even though this still created a ROUND TWO 
comprised of 529 individual responses that failed the ROUND ONE.  We then used these 
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“fails” to develop a spreadsheet-based instrument to use in Survey, Part-2 – ROUND 
TWO.   
Survey, Part-2 – ROUND TWO 
In ROUND TWO of Survey, Part-2, a spreadsheet was sent out to each Delphi 
panelist for them to compare their ratings with the aggregated ratings of the Delphi panel 
as a whole.  This spreadsheet included a matrix with all group means (this matrix placed 
at the bottom of the spreadsheet), a matrix with the respondent’s responses from ROUND 
ONE (this matrix placed in the middle of the spreadsheet), and a changeable matrix with 
blacked out cells that were not statistically different from ROUND ONE (this matrix was 
placed at the top of the spreadsheet).  Additionally, to make it easier for the panelist to 
navigate within the matrix without having to continually refer to the attached AFMAN 
36-2108 AFSC Duty Description page (see Appendix CL), each ratable cell within the 
spreadsheet included an imbedded comment describing exactly what the panelists were 
being asked to rate (e.g. Egress Sys Jymn/Crftmn effectiveness in MX Supt, Non-Tac 
Acft QA Position).  Lastly, a “comments” section was provided on the bottom of the 
grading sheet to give each panelist the opportunity to provide feedback (see Appendix E).   
Respondents were instructed to analyze the aggregated manning effectiveness 
matrix derived from ROUND ONE and any comments provided by other panel members.  
If, after viewing the data, they wished to modify any of their ROUND ONE ratings, the 
panelist was instructed to fill in their ratings in the top matrix then send the completed 
file back to the researcher.  This was considered their Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO 
response (See Table 10).  Of the 14 responses received from respondents in ROUND 
TWO, thirteen modified their ROUND ONE responses in varying degrees while one 
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panelist held fast on his ROUND ONE responses.  Also, only one panelist provided 
comments (see Table 11).  Table 12 is a demographic snapshot of the 14 respondents in 
Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO.  The data responses from ROUND TWO were then used 
as a basis to develop the Aircraft Maintenance QA Manning Effectiveness Matrix.  (Note: 
It was determined from e-mail and telephonic responses from the majority of members on 
the Delphi panel to the researcher, that a third round of the Delphi technique would result 
in no further adjustment to their individual ratings, and thus would be counterproductive 
to the effort). 
Table 10 – Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO Initial Response – QA Effectiveness 
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Table 11 – Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO Panel of Experts’ Comments 
Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO Comments 
I was fully satisfied with the original percentages. 
I have worked with “out of limits” inspectors before at Base X and Prince Sultan Air 
Base, Saudi Arabia.  Their ability to perform was adequately captured in the 1-5 scale 
you gave. 
I believe that QA is a meter of the maintenance being done, and not a 
driver…therefore, no matter how well (or poorly) QA does their job, maintenance 
indicators will not be dramatically affected (either good or bad). 
It is imperative that the best match possible be made to ensure the Commanders get the 
best picture of the job being done…additionally we must not skimp on manning the 
slots. 
I know in this day and age of force shaping, my opinion runs against the current, but we 
have reached a point where you can’t cut anymore without affecting the quality of 
maintenance.  The use of technology is all well and good, and the inclusion of “less 
maintenance intense” aircraft is a step in the right direction (remember the F-15 self 
diagnostics and the B-1 central integrated test system) nothing will replace the right 
number of well qualified Airmen. 
 
Table 12 – Survey, Part-2 ROUND TWO Panel of Experts Demographic Data 
Rank Number 
Average Number Years 
Aircraft/Munitions Maintenance 
Experience 
Lt Colonel 1 18 
Major 1 15 
Captain 1 9 
CMSgt 8 24 
SMSgt 3 18 
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Totals 14 20.4 
 
 
As is the case in many studies using the Delphi method, the variability in 
responses can create problems when trying to gain utility from the data.  But, the 
variability in itself is good – it accurately reflects reality.  These differences of opinion 
exist in leadership and management levels throughout the Air Force and are one of the 
motivators behind making things happen.  For, if everyone thought exactly alike, 
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creativity and ingenuity would be stifled.  This variability only strengthens results.  But 
how do we best handle it to gain the utility we spoke of earlier?   
In the case of the AFSC manning effectiveness rates determined by two Delphi 
rounds, there was variability, and, to get a usable worker effectiveness matrix, we needed 
to determine how to treat the data.  First, since we did not want to mix data sets, we only 
used data from panelists who responded to both ROUNDs ONE and TWO.  Next we 
adopted a low, medium, high approach to ensure that the variability of the data was 
properly addressed in the QA manning effectiveness matrix.  To accomplish this, three 
separate and distinct matrixes were derived utilizing the statistical quartile approach (i.e. 
one matrix based on quartile-one, one matrix based on quartile-two, and one matrix based 
on quartile-three) to be used in Phase-Two.  These matrixes were then applied toward the 
resultant manning derived from Phase-Two.  This was the conclusion of Phase-One of the 
research study and the input to Phase-Two.  
Phase Two of the Study 
 Determining How ACC Units Have Manned Their QA Flights 
In Phase Two we need to answer the question: “How have ACC aircraft wings 
historically manned their aircraft QA manning positions” (i.e. we need to quantify the 
manning fit in relation to the UMD)?   To answer this, a spreadsheet was developed (see 
Appendix F) and sent to each of the 16 selected ACC QA flights for them to provide a 
24-month view of their historical manning (see Table 13).   
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Table 13 – List of Participating ACC Bases/Units in Study 
ACC Units in Study 
Barksdale AFB (2 BW) Minot AFB (5 BW) 
Beale AFB (9 RW) Mountain Home AFB (366 FW) 
Cannon AFB (27FW) Nellis AFB (57 FW) 
Davis-Monthan AFB (355 FW) Offutt AFB (55 RW) 
Dyess AFB (7 BW) Pope AFB (28 FG) 
Ellsworth AFB (28 BW) Seymour-Johnson AFB (4 FW) 
Holloman AFB (49 FW) Shaw AFB (20 FW) 
Langley AFB (1 FW) Whiteman AFB (509 BW) 
 
Specifically, each ACC QA flight was asked to fill in the provided spreadsheet 
with an authorized AFSC and an assigned AFSC for each manpower position on their 
UMD, by month, from January 2003 to December 2004.  The completed and returned 
ACC unit UMD spreadsheets along with the Aircraft Maintenance QA Manning 
Effectiveness Matrix derived in Phase-One were then used to compute an overall quality 
assurance effectiveness percentage of aggregated assigned manning for each ACC QA 
flight by month. 
Comparing MXG Manning with QA Flight Manning Effectiveness  
In order to address a large issue with the data, monthly assigned and authorized 
manning levels for maintenance AFSCs assigned to each of the ACC units’ Maintenance 
Groups (MXG) under study were requested from ACC/DPIM.  However, due to 
computer database limitations at ACC/DPIM, acquiring a complete historical 
representation of assigned manning at the units under study for the entire timeframe was 
impossible.  Therefore, only monthly manning data from January 2004 to December 2004 
was available.  Furthermore, since gathering the data by AFSC to the five significant 
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digit-level would be an expensive manpower drain on ACC/DPIM resources, only 
aggregated AFSC data for the 2A, 2E, 2M and 2W AFS’s at the two-digit level was 
requested.  The retrieved data was then paired down to AFS’s that significantly impacted 
the study (2A’s and 2W’s).  This was considered sufficient since the 2E and 2M AFS’s 
comprised less than 0.08 percent of overall assigned QA manpower for all authorized 
AFS’s and were found at only two of the participating units in the study.   
Once the manning data was received, it was parsed to eliminate assigned and 
authorized three-levels AFSCs from the data in order to ensure only those AFSCs and 
skill levels normally assigned to ACC QA flights (i.e. 5-, 7-, 9-, and 0-level AFSCs) were 
counted.  Next, all assigned and all authorized manning for both of the two focal AFS’s 
(i.e. 2A plus 2W assigned; 2A plus 2W authorized) were summed for each unit under 
study.  We then calculated a ratio of overall assigned-to-authorized by unit, by month, to 
gain an understanding into each unit’s overall manning structure.  Although this overall 
MXG manning data covered only half of the timeframe covered by the study for our 
computed QA manning effectiveness data, it still provided limited, but valuable insight 
into the manning practice of the units under study. 
Phase-Three of the Study 
In Phase Three we compiled data from each of the units in the key unit- and wing-
level metrics areas indicated by the Delphi panel of experts in Survey, Part-1 in Phase-
One of the study for the timeframe, January 2003 to December 2004.  Specifically, we 
gathered only maintenance-related historical flying safety data (Class A, B, C from the 
Air Force Safety Center) and maintenance-related ground safety data (Class A, B, C, and 
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Other from the HQ/ACC Ground Safety Office).  Furthermore, we acquired QA metrics 
from each of the unit’s QA flights under study (i.e. various inspection pass rates), and 
Foreign Object Damage (FOD) along with Dropped Object (DOP) data from each of the 
unit’s FOD/DOP monitors.  Lastly, we accumulated the remainder of the key unit metrics 
from the units’ Maintenance Analysis Flights (i.e. Flying Scheduling Effectiveness Rate, 
Mission Capable Rate, Repeat Rate, Recur Rate, etc.).         
We next applied the results of Phase-Two (e.g. calculated QA flight manning 
effectiveness) to all of the participating maintenance units that had differing overall QA 
manning effectiveness levels to the gathered data.  We first performed a Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient analysis between each of the indicated metrics 
(i.e. Mission Capable Repeat, FOD/DOP, Mishaps, etc.) to the calculated QA manning 
effectiveness rate for each participating unit in an effort to determine any existing 
bivariate relationships.  We then performed a regression analysis between the QA 
manning effectiveness rates and each of the indicated metrics across all participating 
ACC units.   
Phase-Four of the Study 
Phase-Four completed the study by answering Investigative Question-3: “What is 
the relationship between QA flight manning effectiveness and the key unit- and wing-
level metrics?”  This was accomplished by analyzing and evaluating the statistical results 
to derive any practical usefulness to aircraft maintenance managers making QA manning 
decisions.  Using these results, we then performed a sample benefit-cost analysis.  And 
lastly, the statistical results were analyzed in an attempt to validate what the experts in the 
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field felt the impact that QA as an entity has on key unit- and wing-level metrics.  This 
was performed by comparing the experts’ responses in Phase-One, Survey, Part-1 and the 
statistical measures derived from Phase-Three to determine where they matched, and 
where they differed.   
Scope and Limitations of Research Study 
 Data Collection Issues 
There were several instances where units chose not collect certain types of 
optional metric data (e.g. one unit does not collect Phase Key Task List Pass rate data 
separately from Quality Verification Pass rate data).  To handle this, we used statistical 
tools such as pair-wise analysis versus list-wise analysis.  Also, one unit could not give 
the full 24-month QA assigned manning look-back which we also handled with pair-wise 
analysis. 
About Correlation and Regression Analysis 
When considering the correlation analysis, it frequently may not be appropriate to 
consider the X-values as known constants whereas correlation analysis provides an 
avenue to infer relationships between variables without risking errors associated with 
confidence coefficients (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, and Li, 2004).  In our procedures, we 
attempted to derive any existing significant correlation and direction between the 
indicated overall QA flight manning effectiveness levels and each of the indicated 
metrics.  The results of this analysis were used to draw conclusions and postulate 
potential mitigating strategies for maintenance leaders and managers to use when 
assigning personnel to QA Flight manpower positions in the final phase of the study.  
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Addressing Potential Problems with Self-Reports 
 Padsakoff and Organ identified six categories of self-report (i.e. a survey is a self-
report), presented circumstances where problems may manifest, and discussed methods 
for mitigating these problems.  The six identified categories of self-report are: 
1) Obtaining demographic or otherwise factual data (such as age or sex of 
respondent, years of tenure, etc.), that are, in principle, verifiable form other 
sources. 
2) Assessing the effectiveness of experimental manipulations. 
3) Gathering personality data (trait, anxiety, need for achievement, locus of control, 
and so forth). 
4) Obtaining descriptions of a respondent’s past or characteristic behavior (e.g., 
asking supervisors about there “structuring” behaviors), and/or seeking 
respondent’s intentions of future behavior (e.g., to quit), or how they would 
behave under certain hypothetical conditions (i.e., various role-playing 
exercises). 
5) Scaling the psychological states of respondents, such as job attitudes, tension, or 
motivation. 
6) Soliciting respondents’ perceptions of an external environmental variable (the 
supervisor’s behavior, formalization of organizational processes, climate) 
(Podsakoff and Organ, 1985). 
 
For our surveys, we need to address category ‘1’ since we gathered demographic data on 
our respondents for the purpose of verifying their status as maintenance subject matter 
experts.  Category ‘6’ was also relevant since respondents were asked to provide opinions 
on which key unit- and wing-level metrics are most impacted by QA effectiveness along 
with how they felt workers would perform under certain circumstances.   
 When addressing, category-1 problems, we were well assured that the responses 
were correct for the two primary data elements: years of aircraft/munitions maintenance 
experience and rank.  Since all respondents were military personnel, their reported years 
of experience can reasonably be expected to coincide closely with the job position they 
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held (i.e. a QA maintenance superintendent or a maintenance group chief would most 
likely have not risen to that position without substantial experience).   
When it came to category-6 issues, we addressed the potential biases inherent in 
perception-based surveys.  To help control for this, we first ensured not to provide too 
much detail to the respondents as to the nature of the survey, beyond providing basic 
instructional guidance.  In essence, we did not want respondents to know the overall 
intent of the study so as to avert the potential that they would overtly or unintentionally 
stage their answers in an attempt to bias the survey.   
A second issue with our survey, was the shear magnitude of time required to 
complete Survey, Part-2 since it was expected (from a beta-test) to take anywhere from 
30-minutes to two-hours per respondent, for each round of the Delphi.  According to 
Padsakaoff, et al., respondents taking long surveys can experience “transient mood 
states” where a consistent, yet artifactual bias may be introduced across measures.  To 
control for this, we provided a “Save & Return Later” function in the computer-based 
Survey, part II ROUND-ONE.  Also, since we conducted Survey, Part II, ROUND-TWO 
through a spreadsheet-based instrument, this also allowed respondents to start, save, and 
restart as required.  
Another issue we addressed is the potential bias attributable to trait, source and 
methods.  For instance, in our study, a respondent who is a “crew chief by trade” may 
have tended to have consistently higher or lower expectations on how effective another 
person possessing their same AFSC may perform other jobs (i.e. an electrician 
respondent may feel that an average electrician would be more apt to handle any job they 
are assigned to well, and thus this may bias their ratings when considering electricians.  
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This is because they are experts on electrical systems and the electricians who work 
them).  However, this particular bias would most likely not exist when these same 
personnel are considering workers possessing other AFSCs.   
To counteract this potentiality, we provided straightforward and explicit 
instructions repeatedly through the Delphi rounds for the respondents to ensure they 
considered “average” personnel and also to base their responses on their own experiences 
and beliefs (see Delphi instructions in Appendixes A-D). 
Lastly, we controlled for this potential bias by ensuring our respondent group was 
diverse and varied.  In the aggregate, personnel in our respondent group possessed many 
different ranks, came from many different AFSC backgrounds (crew chiefs, avionics, 
munitions, weapons, structural repair, fuels systems, etc.), worked on different aircraft 
and munitions types (bombers, fighters, special assets), and were assigned to many 
different bases (see Tables, 5, 7, 10, 12).  This good cross-sectional response is 
considered to have mitigated any remaining biases. We coupled these strategies, with the 
power of the Delphi method to eliminate the “round-table” meeting influence, and 
achieved a very robust system of bias-mitigating check and balances.   
In the next chapter, we calculate an overall manning effectiveness level by month 
for each of the unit‘s QA flight by applying the derived manning effectiveness matrix 
from Phase-One of the study to the data acquired from the units under study from Phase-
Two.  We will also examine the overall MXG assigned manning as it related to the 
calculated QA manning effectiveness levels. 
 
IV.  Results – QA Manning Effectiveness  
Overview  
In this chapter we calculate the overall manning effectiveness for each of the QA 
flights and then perform an analysis of Maintenance Group (MXG) assigned manning as 
it relates to this effectiveness. 
Our Assumptions 
 The following assumptions were used in evaluating results in Chapters IV and V: 
1) The Unit Manning Document requirements are the optimum manning needs to 
create the best mix of maintenance oversight and worker capability. 
2) The models we create are interpretive, not predictive. 
3) The models we create provide a broad view across all participating units and may 
or may not be indicative of a hard and fast rule applicable to all units. 
4) Although we understand that QA personnel are pulled from the larger 
Maintenance Group (MXG) manning pool, we will not attempt to model the 
dichotomy of tradeoffs caused by this action (i.e. what would be the opportunity 
cost of pulling a technician off the flight line and put them in a QA position?).  
5) All quantitative monetary analyses assume a person is hired into the MXG and a 
technician from the MXG manning pools possessing the required six months 
time-on-station, is then assigned to QA.   
6) Once a person is assigned to a manpower position at a unit, there is a one-month 
lag between their arrival at the duty station and them becoming a viable asset to 
the unit.   
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7) All persons possessing the AFS’s in the reported manning data are fully capable, 
are assigned as assets under the MX Group manning structure, and are not 
performing duties outside of their AFS (e.g. Dormitory Chief, Honor Guard, etc.).  
Table 19 and Figure 12 examine this correlation. 
Calculating Manning Effectiveness Levels for QA Flights 
After examining all of the historically assigned manning lists from each of the QA 
flights, we discovered several instances where AFSCs other than those that were 
authorized by the aggregated ACC Unit Manning Document (UMD) from Phase-One, 
were being used in QA flights.  This created a problem where we needed to go back to 
the Delphi Panel to get them to evaluate the effectiveness of each of these ten newly 
uncovered AFSC combinations.   
We then took the outcome of the first Delphi study, and after examining the 
resultant matrix, determined that the range of values for each AFSC combination (i.e. the 
1st to 3rd quartile range) was relatively small for the majority of AFSC combinations 
within the matrix.  Using this as a guide, we determined the median value for each AFSC 
combination was the appropriate effectiveness rating to apply to any AFSC-mismatch 
encountered in actual QA manning data received from the field (see Table 14). 
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Table 14 – Results of Initial and Supplemental Delphi Survey – AFSC Combinations 
 
 
Next, we formatted each of the 16 returned QA flight historical manning charts and 
assigned the proper effectiveness rating for each manpower position reported by month, 
for each unit.  When assigning effectiveness ratings to each authorized position, we used 
the following four-rule process: 
1) If an authorized QA manpower position was filled with a person possessing the 
AFSC called for in the UMD, the position effectiveness was rated 100 percent 
effective (e.g. a worker with AFSC 2A5X3 assigned to a 2A5X3 QA position).   
2) If the person filling a QA position possessed an AFSC other than that called for in 
the UMD, the appropriate effectiveness level derived from the QA manning 
effectiveness charts was assigned to that position (e.g. a person with AFSC 
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2A5X3 assigned to a 2A5X1 QA position would be rated 41 percent effective as 
derived from the QA Manning Effectiveness Matrix).   
3) Instances where UMD manpower positions were double-filled (i.e. two persons 
possessing AFSC 2A3X3 were assigned against one UMD-authorized 2A3X3 
manpower position), were rated as 100 percent effective.  The rationale for this 
was that, although not authorized for in the UMD, these “extra” personnel provide 
capability and more capability “should be better”, thus proper credit should be 
applied to possibly offset deficiencies in other areas.   
4) All unfilled QA positions were rated as zero percent effective.   
Once all individual QA manpower positions were assigned manning effectiveness 
ratings, a simple average was computed for each month to determine each QA flight’s 
overall manning effectiveness rating.  As mentioned earlier, this process was repeated for 
all individual QA positions, by month, for all participating QA flights (see Table 15 for 
an example on how monthly QA effectiveness is calculated; see Appendixes BK-1 to BZ-
2 for all participating units’ calculated QA effectiveness tables).  
Table 15 – Excerpt Example of Assigned Unit QA Manpower by Position, by Month 
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Table 16 – QA Flight Calculated Manning Effectiveness for Participating Bases 
 
 
In the next step we aggregate the monthly manning effectiveness sores for all 
participating QA flights into one chart to develop our time-series (see Table 16). 
Analyzing the Manning Effectiveness Levels for QA Flights 
The calculated manning effectiveness levels in Table 16 reveal that all but two 
units experienced transitory fluctuations in manning effectiveness from month-to-month 
(one had a stable 100 percent calculated QA manning effectiveness and the other had a 
stable 95 percent effectiveness score for the entire timeframe of the study).  Although the 
stable effectiveness levels is desirable in daily practice, it does however create a 
confound for this study because we are searching for links associated with QA manning 
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effectiveness variability.  If the independent variable (i.e. a unit’s calculated QA manning 
effectiveness levels) never changes, then any variability in the dependant metric variable 
data (e.g. Mission Capable rate, Repeat rate, Mishap counts) merely becomes noise.     
Comparing Manning for MX Groups to Calculated QA Effectiveness  
Since all QA manning is taken from the larger Maintenance Group (MXG) 
manpower structure, its manpower is dependant upon available MXG manning.  Thus, it 
is necessary to analyze the overall MXG manning in order to gain an understanding into 
the QA manning construct and the cross-impacts involved.  Furthermore, the capability of 
acquiring the assigned historical MXG manning at the participating units was hampered 
by limited access to the data and manpower resources at the headquarters level.  
However, we were able to accumulate and calculate an assigned/authorized manpower 
ratio for the two most prevalent AFS’s (2A and 2W) found in the QA flights in the study 
for the timeframe January 2004 to December 2004 (see Table 17).    
Table 17 – MXG Derived 2A and 2W Manning for Participating Bases  
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Once we had this data, we performed a Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficient analysis to determine the linear relationships between MXG manning and 
calculated QA manning effectiveness.   
 Table 18 – MX Group Assigned Manning Correlated w/ QA Manning Effectiveness 
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Figure 13 – MXG Assigned Manning Correlated w/ QA Manning Effectiveness 
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 We used a 1-month lag in the analysis (MXG assigned manning in month-j is 
correlated with the calculated QA flight manning effectiveness in Month j+1) to account 
for individual unit in-processing actions, etc.).  From this we found that three units (2 
BW, 509 BW, and 49 FW) have a zero-correlation coefficient between their MXG 
assigned manning and their QA flight manning effectiveness.  This was the expected 
result in the case of the 2 BW and the 49 FW since there was no variability in their 
calculated QA flight manning effectiveness, while there was in the corresponding MXG 
assigned manning data.  Next we found that one unit has a weak positive correlation 
between MXG assigned manning and QA flight manning effectiveness (28 BW), five 
units with a weak-to-moderate negative correlation coefficient (1 FW, 27 FW, 366 FW, 5 
BW, and 9 RW), and one unit with a moderate negative correlation coefficient (7 BW).  
Lastly, we observed five units with a moderate-to-strong positive correlation between 
MXG assigned manning and QA flight manning effectiveness (355 FW, 4 FW, 55 RW, 
57 FW), with the 20 FW having a near-perfect correlation (see Table 18 and Figure 13).   
Table 19 – Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient Relationships 
Correlation 
Coefficient   Indication Resultant Action 
-1.0 Strong Positive Relationship 
As one variable increases, 
the other variable increases
0.0 No Relationship None 
1.0 Strong Negative Relationship 
As one variable increases, 
the other variable 
decreases 
 
 We performed one further analysis of the MXG assigned manning as it related to 
the QA manning effectiveness levels which consisted on counting the number of months 
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for all units where MXG assigned manning exceeded QA flight manning effectiveness 
and vice-versa.  We then took this raw data and converted it to a ratio for all ACC bases.   
Table 20 – Relationship between MXG Manning and QA Manning Effectiveness 
 
 
 
The data in Table 20 indicate that for approximately 60 percent of the months in Calendar 
Year 2004 (using zero-lag), the individual units’ MXG assigned manning for AFS’s 2A 
and 2W was less than the calculated QA flight effectiveness, and for approximately 40 
percent of the months, MXG assigned manning was more than that of their respective QA 
flight’s effectiveness level.  This raises an important question associated with this study: 
“Should QA manning track that of assigned manning within its respective MXG?”  In 
other words, should all maintenance functions share equally in the pain when there is a 
lack of manning or should low-density, high-demand functions be fully manned?  Since 
there are different opinions on this, we will table it for now, and revisit it in Chapter VI. 
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Basically, the utility of this data to the study is that it paints a rough picture of 
how manning is being apportioned by the various units to their QA flights.  For instance, 
for a unit with a positive correlation, their MXG assigned manning fluctuates in the same 
direction as their QA flight manning effectiveness.  On the other hand, the negative 
correlation for manning is interesting, because this indicates that, as the unit’s assigned 
“2A and 2W” percentage of assigned manning changed, the QA manning effectiveness 
responded with a change in the opposite direction.   
In examining the manning data (see Table 20), this anomaly seems to be caused 
more by variability within the MXG assigned data than by changes within the QA flight 
manning effectiveness.  This may indicate that the lag-factor between when people are 
assigned to a maintenance group to when manning structure changes are actually made, 
may be more pronounced than just the one-month lag that we modeled. 
Table 21 – Example Raw Data used for Correlation Calculations 
 
 
 
 We need to caution the reader not to draw conclusions based solely on this 
correlation data for various reasons.  First, this correlation analysis is based on a limited 
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sample size of data points for only twelve months of MXG manning.  Second, the data 
for QA flight manning effectiveness is not a raw number like the MXG assigned manning 
data but is rather a calculated percentage based on the derived manning effectiveness 
assignment process.  Third, manpower at stateside assigned bases follow a “fair-share” 
process whereby average worldwide manning levels are used to determine percentages of 
manning for each AFSC to be assigned to each of the bases, thus there is no one model 
that fits all of the units under study.  The last and most important fact to consider before 
passing judgment, is the very dynamic nature of the manning assignment process where 
maintenance managers make daily manpower determinations based on changing 
requirements and constraints. 
In the Chapter V we examine the metric data relevant to the calculated QA 
manning effectiveness data in order to derive any relevant insights, and in Chapter VI we 
present conclusions and recommendations.       
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V.  Results – Analyzing the Metrics Relevant to QA Manning Effectiveness 
Overview 
In this chapter we use the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient 
analysis procedure to investigate relationships between the calculated QA Manning 
Effectiveness and subsequent time lags for each of the participating units, versus the 
metrics confirmed by the subject matter experts in the Delphi Survey, Part-1.  We will 
also perform regression analysis to determine any significance between the independent 
variable (QA Manning Effectiveness) and each of the dependent variables arrayed across 
the 16 ACC units in the study.    
The Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient  
Mathematically the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is: 
 
xy
xx yy
SS
r
SS SS
=   (note:  SS =sums of squares; x=indep. variable; y=dep. variable).   
 
This is a useful mathematical tool for gaining a macro view of linear relationships 
between individual data sets.  Furthermore, to save time, we will use the statistical 
analysis software program JMP® to perform the correlation calculations.   
The Process Overview for Analyzing Each Metric, by Variable, by Unit 
We will use the “by-metric” approach to analyze each of the indicated metrics.  
More specifically, we will analyze each of the 25 metrics in alphabetical order and, under 
each of the specific metric headings, we will first define each metric that was indicated 
by the Delphi Panel of Experts in Phase-One of the study.  We will then use the 
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<Multivariate> command in JMP®  for each of the metrics (Abort, Mission Capable, 
Repeat, Recur, Mishap, etc.) and the QA Manning Effectiveness rates for each of the 
units to create a correlation matrix.   
This correlation matrix will provide us with correlation strength (linear 
relationship) along with the direction of relationship between the variables.  Furthermore, 
to gain greatest insight into potential lag-relationships between the variables, each metric 
will be lagged in monthly increments from zero (contemporaneous) to four (note: a QA 
manning effect on a resultant metric after four months will be considered to have 
occurred by chance).  Next, these correlations will be aggregated and collated by metric 
across all 16 participating units to allow us to analyze any recurrent themes.  First, it 
should be noted that Barksdale AFB and Holloman AFB are not included on any of the 
metric correlation analysis tables because the results of the Pearson product-moment 
correlation analysis will always indicate a zero correlation across all “Lags”.  This is due 
to the fact that both units had zero variation in their calculated QA Manning 
Effectiveness during the 2003-2004 period and thus zero variability within any of the 
measured metrics, will always result in a reported zero correlation coefficient.  We will 
begin with the Abort Rate metric. 
 
Abort Rate (AR)  
The AR metric is a leading indicator of both aircraft reliability and quality of 
maintenance performed.  It is the percentage of missions aborted in the air and on the 
ground.  Furthermore, an abort is a sortie that ends prematurely and must be re-
accomplished (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3.1).  The Abort rate is calculated as: 
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Air+GroundAbortsAR(%)= *100
TotalSortiesFlown+GroundAborts
 
Analyzing the reported Abort rates from ACC/LGP against the calculated QA manning 
effectiveness rates indicated that correlations across all bases were not uniform for Abort 
rates, however several units had periods of relatively high correlations (> +/- 0.45) (see 
Appendix AF).  Also, the data seems to indicate a negative correlation for the F-16, 
Block 30’s at Cannon AFB starting in Lag-0 and lasting until Lag-3.  This makes sense if 
the QA Manning Effectiveness was a factor for Aborts (i.e. as Manning Effectiveness 
increases, Abort rates decrease = GOOD).  This negative relationship also occurred at 
Mountain Home F-16, Block 50’s in Lag-2 and -3, and at Pope in Lag-3.   
Conversely, the A-10s at Davis-Monthan AFB indicate a moderate positive 
correlation for operational and training A-10 units across Lags-0, -1, and -2.  
Additionally, five aircraft types at Nellis AFB exhibited positive correlations over several 
different lags.  This is counter-intuitive, since we would expect Abort rates to decrease if 
QA manning effectiveness had a significant impact on this metric.    
The overall analysis for the Abort rate metric is that although several of the 
individual bases indicate potential value in analyzing Abort rates as related to their 
individual QA manning effectiveness levels, the data do not support a determination that 
Abort rates can be directly tied to QA manning effectiveness as a potential trend across 
ACC bases (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  We will now examine the 
Break Rate metric. 
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Break Rate (BR)  
The BR metric is a leading, flying-related metric and is an indicator of both 
aircraft reliability and quality of maintenance performed.  It is the percentage of aircraft 
that land “Code-3” (unable to complete at least one of its assigned missions) (AFI 21-
101, para 1.10.3.2).  It is calculated as: 
NumberSortiesThatLandCode3BR(%)= *100
TotalSortiesFlown
 
Analyzing the reported Break rates from ACC/LGP against the calculated QA Manning 
Effectiveness rates yielded the results listed in Appendix AH.  As the appendix reveals, 
correlations across all bases were not uniform for Break rates, with nine bases with at 
least one assigned aircraft unit showing a weak to moderate negative correlation (GOOD) 
between Break rate and QA manning effectiveness.  This makes sense if the QA manning 
effectiveness was a factor for Break rates (i.e. as Manning effectiveness increases, Break 
rates decrease = GOOD).     
Conversely, as was the case with Abort rates, five bases had Break rates in 
individual aircraft units with moderate positive correlations between Break rate and QA 
manning effectiveness.  Again, this is counter-intuitive since, we would expect to see 
Break rates to decrease if QA manning effectiveness had a significant impact on this 
metric type. 
The overall determination is that although several of the individual bases indicate 
potential value in analyzing Break rates as related to their individual QA manning 
effectiveness, the data do not support an overall determination that Break rates can be 
directly tied to QA manning effectiveness as a potential trend across ACC bases (see 
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Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  The next metric we will examine is the CANN 
Rate metric. 
Cannibalization (CR) Rate  
The CR metric is a leading indicator that reflects the number of cannibalization 
(CANN) actions (removal of a serviceable part from an aircraft or engine to replace an 
unserviceable part on another aircraft or engine).  Since Base Supply relies on the 
maintenance shops and depot for replenishment, this indicator can be used in part to 
indicate maintenance shop and depot support (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3.2).  It is calculated 
as: 
NumberAircraftEngineCANNSCR(%)= *100
TotalSortiesFlown
 
Analyzing the reported CANN rates from ACC/LGP against the calculated QA manning 
effectiveness rates yielded the results listed in Appendix AI.  As the appendix shows, 
correlations across all bases were not uniform for CANN rates, but at eleven of the 14 
bases, CANN rates indicated a moderately negative (GOOD) correlation between CANN 
rates and QA manning effectiveness for at least one aircraft unit at each base but mainly 
concentrated in the Lag-1 to -3 range.  This makes sense if QA manning effectiveness is a 
factor for CANN Rates (i.e. as QA manning effectiveness increases CANN rates 
decrease=GOOD).     
Conversely, as was the case with Aborts, eight bases had CANN rates in 
individual aircraft units with moderate positive correlations between CANN rates and QA 
manning effectiveness.  Again, this is counter-intuitive, since we would expect to see 
CANN rates decrease if QA manning effectiveness had a significant impact on this 
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metric.  The overall determination is that there is some evidence at the majority of 
maintenance units in the study to indicate potential value in analyzing CANN rates as 
related to their individual QA manning effectiveness across ACC bases (see Survey, Part-
1 Comments, Appendix F).  We will now examine the Combined Mishap Count metric.  
Combined Mishap (CombMis) Count  
The CombMis Count metric is an aggregated count of all Class A, B, and C 
Mishaps both for flight and ground that are specifically related to maintenance.  Also 
included are preventable aviation maintenance-related injuries and incidents that did not 
meet the $20,000 minimum reporting criteria.  Basically, the Combined Mishap Count is 
a measure of the extent that maintainers follow directives.  Analyzing the reported 
Combined Mishap counts acquired from the Air Force Safety Center and ACC Ground 
Safety against QA manning effectiveness rates yielded the results listed in Appendix AO.  
As the appendix shows, correlations across all bases were not uniform for Combined 
Mishaps counts, but seven of the 14 bases indicated moderate negative correlations with 
QA manning effectiveness Rates (GOOD) for Lag-0 to Lag-3.  Furthermore, three of the 
remaining seven bases indicated a moderate positive correlation between Combined 
Mishaps and QA manning effectiveness (BAD) in Lag-0.  Although the data do not 
support categorizing the negative correlations as a trend across all ACC units under 
study, any correlations (positive or negative) of Combined Mishap counts with any other 
variable should be promptly examined by maintenance management and the necessary 
mitigating strategies implemented (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  The next 
two metrics, Dropped Object and Foreign Object Damage counts, are examined together 
because they are both important indicators of the quality of a base’s maintenance 
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practices and are monitored and reported by each base’s Foreign Object Damage 
Prevention office.  
Dropped Object (DOP) and Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Counts  
The DOP and FOD Count metrics are two separate metrics and are aggregated 
counts of occurrences of preventable Dropped Object counts and Foreign Object Damage 
counts respectively.  A Dropped Object is an item that falls off of an aircraft (un-
commanded) while in-flight.  More specifically, our data only includes those DOPs 
attributable to maintenance.  A FOD incident is a maintenance-related occurrence of 
“preventable” damage caused by a foreign object, or is a lost tool or object that is not 
recovered that is considered “preventable” (caused by maintenance or operations 
personnel).     
Appendix AJ indicates that DOP counts had a low-to-moderate incidence of 
negative correlation with QA manning effectiveness at seven of 14 bases during at least 
one lag period.  Also, FOD counts correlated negatively with QA manning effectiveness 
at eight of the 14 bases.  The overall analysis of the DOP/FOD count correlations is that 
the data suggests there is an overall low-to-moderate linear link with QA manning 
effectiveness rates.  We will next perform a correlation analysis between Material 
Deficiency Report counts submitted and QA manning effectiveness rates. 
Deficiency Reports (DR) Count  
The count of DRs submitted measures the number of instances technicians file 
material deficiency reports on defective parts.  More DRs submitted is considered better 
because this suggests that maintenance personnel are being proactive in trying to resolve 
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parts-related trends.  Thus, a positive correlation with QA manning effectiveness is 
considered GOOD and a negative correlation, BAD.    
Examining the data in Appendix AK, we find that four of the 14 bases have a 
moderate positive correlation between DR counts and QA manning effectiveness during 
at least one lag period, and that eight of the 14 bases have a moderately negative 
correlation during at least one lag period.  The overall correlation analysis of data for 
DRs Submitted counts does not support an ACC-wide trend but may indicate local trends 
for some of the bases.  We now perform a correlation analysis between the count of 
Detected Safety Violation Counts and QA manning effectiveness rates.  
Detected Safety Violations (DSV) Count  
The DSV Count metric is solely a QA function.  These are counts of instances 
where individuals are observed by QA personnel committing unsafe acts (e.g. a person 
standing on the top step of an A-frame ladder, or not wearing protective eyewear when 
handling caustic liquids).  Although a low count of detected safety violations is 
intuitively a good thing, more QA manning effectiveness may not always translate into 
lower incidents.  There are two ways to interpret these phenomena: (1) the more effective 
QA flight will catch deficiencies quicker and more often and thus a higher count will 
result; (2) the more effective QA flight will tend to deter these personnel from taking 
shortcuts and thus the DSV count will be less.  Thus, both views can be considered 
correct.  Now we will proceed to the analysis.   
The data in the correlation table in Appendix AM for DSV counts reveals twelve 
of 14 bases with low-to-moderate correlations between DSV counts and QA manning 
effectiveness rates (four positively correlated and eight negatively correlated).  And, 
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since the QA management team at the unit-level sets the tone for how to deal with DSVs, 
we cannot make a GOOD/BAD ruling from the limited data we have.  However, we can 
make a reasonable observation and say that the data seem to support the postulate that 
DSV counts are correlated across ACC bases as a function of QA manning effectiveness 
(see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  The next metric we will examine is the Fix 
Rate metric.  
Fix Rate (FR) Metric  
The FR metric is a leading indicator showing how well the repair process is being 
managed and is an excellent tool for tracking “dead time” in aircraft repair processes 
because it measures the speed of repair and equipment maintainability (AFI 21-101, para 
1.10.3.6).  The FR is the percentage of aircraft landing with failures that are returned to 
flyable status within a designated time standard (either 4, 8, or 12-hours depending on the 
type of aircraft).  The mathematical formula is:  
Code3BreaksFixedWithinX-HoursFR(%) *100
TotalCode3Breaks
=  
This is another metric that elicits dichotomous views from people on how an effective 
QA flight impacts Fix rates.  On the one hand, it is thought that a more effective QA will 
result in a quicker fix time because technicians will tend to follow technical data more 
closely.  The opposing view is that a more effective QA flight will be more visible, and 
thus tend to slow repair processes because technicians will take their time and thus take 
fewer short cuts to ensure they are not making mistakes or missing steps.    
The data in the correlation table in Appendix AH for Fix rates reveals 14 of 14 
bases with low-to-moderate correlations between Fix rates and QA manning effectiveness 
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rates in at least one of their assigned aircraft units during at least one lag period (ten 
positively correlated and four negatively correlated).  And, since the local QA 
management sets the tone for how they deal with technicians working jobs, we cannot 
make a GOOD/BAD ruling from the limited data we have.  However, we can make a 
reasonable observation that the data seems to support the postulate that Fix rates are 
correlated across ACC bases as a function of QA manning effectiveness (see Survey, 
Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  The next metric we will examine is Flying Schedule 
Effectiveness (FSE) Rate.  
Flying Scheduling Effectiveness (FSE) Rate  
The FSE Rate metric is a leading indicator and measures how well the unit 
planned and executed the weekly flying schedule.  Deviations that decrease the FSE from 
100 percent include: scheduled sorties not flown because of maintenance, supply, 
operations, HHQ, air traffic control, or other causes.  This measure is important because 
disruptions to the flying schedule can cause turmoil on the flight line and create ripple 
affects throughout other agencies (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3.7).  The mathematical 
formula for FSE is:  
AdjustedSortiesScheduledMinusChargeableDeviationsFSE(%) *100
AdjustedSortiesScheduled
=  
The data in Appendix AN reveal ten of 14 bases exhibited low-to-moderate positive 
correlations between FSE rates and QA manning effectiveness rates in at least one of 
their assigned aircraft units during at least one lag period and eight bases exhibited 
moderate negative correlations between FSE rates and QA manning effectiveness rates in 
at least one assigned aircraft unit.  An overall analysis does not support an ACC-wide 
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trend for a correlation between FSE rates and QA manning effectiveness levels but 
several bases indicate a potential relationship (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix 
F).  The next metric we will examine is In-Flight Emergency Rate.  
In-Flight Emergency (IFE) Rate  
The IFE Rate metric is not tracked by all ACC units (in this study Seymour-
Johnson and Whiteman do not).  Although not considered a primary metric, it is 
nonetheless an important one.  The mathematical formula is:  
NumberInFlightEmergenciesIFE(%) *100
NumberSortiesFlown
=  
First, when it comes to the IFE Rate metric, it is intuitive that fewer is better and thus we 
would want to see a negative correlation (i.e. a higher QA effectiveness rate with a lower 
IFE rate – GOOD).  The data in Appendix AP shows that seven of eleven bases that track 
IFEs exhibit low-to-moderate negative correlations between IFE rates and QA manning 
effectiveness rates in at least one of their assigned aircraft units during at least one lag 
period, and six bases exhibit moderate positive correlations between IFE rates and QA 
manning effectiveness rates in at least one assigned aircraft unit during at least one lag 
period.  An overall analysis does not support an ACC-wide trend for a correlation 
between IFE rates and QA manning effectiveness levels but several bases indicate a 
potential relationship.  The next metric we will examine is the Key Task List Pass Rate 
metric.  
Key Task List (KTL) Pass Rate Metric  
The KTL Pass Rate metric is a direct output of QA.  KTLs are QA maintenance 
inspections on tasks that are complex or that affect safety of flight.  Each time 
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maintenance accomplishes a KTL task, they must notify QA to respond.  It should be 
noted that although QA has directive authority to waiver their evaluation on a KTL item 
on a limited basis, a waiver is a rare exception (as it should be).  The mathematical 
formula for the KTL Pass rate is:  
NumberKTLinspectionsPassedKTLPass(%)= *100
NumberKTLinspectionsPerformed
 
In the realm of KTL pass rates relative to QA manning effectiveness, there are again two 
perspectives: (1) a more effective QA flight will be tougher when performing these 
critical inspections and thus the KTL Pass rate would be expected at least initially to be 
lower, and (2) the more effective QA Flight will influence the maintainers to take their 
time and be more thorough performing tasks before calling QA out to inspect their work 
and thus the KTL Pass rate should be higher.  When analyzing the data in the correlation 
table in Appendix AR, we find nine of the 13 bases that track KTLs separately 
experienced moderate positive correlations between KTL Pass rates and QA manning 
effectiveness rates and four bases had low-to-moderate negative KTL Pass rate 
correlations with QA manning effectiveness.  Additionally, what is interesting about 
these correlations is that most of them track fairly consistently across lags.  As for the 
overall analysis for an ACC-wide trend for a relationship between KTL Pass rates and 
QA manning effectiveness, there is a dichotomy of results with some bases being 
positively correlated and some being negatively correlated which is possibly a function of 
local QA management strategies (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  We will 
now examine the Mission Capable Rate metric.   
 
 
 80
Mission Capable (MC) Rate  
The MC Rate metric is a lagging indicator and represents a broad composite of 
many process and metrics.  According to AFI 21-101, maintenance managers 
experiencing a low MC rate should look for workers deferring work to other shifts, 
inexperienced workers, lack of parts from supply, poor in-shop scheduling, high-
cannibalization rates, or training deficiencies (para 1.10.3.11).  Furthermore, a 2001 Air 
Force Institute of Technology thesis supported the fact that low manpower effectiveness 
at the worker level is a strong predictor of lower MC rates (Oliver, 2001).  But how do 
the MC rates correlate with QA manning effectiveness rates?  The mathematical formula 
for the MC Rate metric is (note: B-type hours are depot-maintenance hours) 
FullyMissionCapableHours+PartialMissionCapableHours-BtypeHoursMC(%)= *100
PossessedHours
 
The data reveal ten of 14 bases exhibited moderate positive correlations between MC 
rates and QA manning effectiveness rates in at least one of their assigned aircraft units 
during at least one lag period (see Appendix AG).  Furthermore, six bases exhibited low-
to-moderate negative correlations between MC rates and QA manning effectiveness rates 
in at least one assigned aircraft unit during at least one lag period.  An overall analysis 
does not support an ACC-wide trend for a correlation between MC rates and QA 
manning effectiveness levels but several bases do indicate a potential relationship.  The 
next metric we will examine is Maintenance Scheduling Effectiveness Rate metric. 
Maintenance Scheduling Effectiveness (MSE) Rate  
The MSE Rate is a leading indicator and measures the unit’s ability to plan and 
complete inspections and periodic maintenance on-time according to the maintenance 
 
 81
plan.  A low MSE rate may indicate a unit is experiencing turbulence on the flight line or 
in the maintenance shops (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3.10).  The mathematical calculation is: 
NumberScheduledMaintenanceActionsCompletedOnTimeMSE(%) *100
TotalNumberMaintenacneActionsScheduled
=  
The data in Appendix AN reveal nine bases with low-to-moderate-to-high positive 
correlations between MSE rates and QA manning effectiveness rates with six bases 
having low-to-moderate negative correlations.  Due to the strength of some of these 
correlations, the data suggests a potential relationship for MSE rates and QA manning 
effectiveness at the majority of ACC bases (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  
The next metric we will examine is Maintenance/Operations Deviations Count metric. 
Maintenance/Operations Deviations (MX/Ops Devs) Count  
Although the MX/Ops Devs Count metric is normally a ratio of the number of 
chargeable times an aircraft does not meet its take-off window (within specific timing 
standards) to the number of sorties scheduled, our data was acquired by counts.  Although 
the normal mathematical formula is: 
NumberMXDeviations+NumberOperationsDeviationsMXOpsDev(%)= *100
NumberSortiesScheduled
, 
we consider this count data as acceptable for the purposes of our study since we are 
performing a “within treatments analysis” (i.e. we are correlating each unit’s counts with 
their respective QA manning effectiveness).  But what exactly constitutes a MX/Ops 
Dev?   
A MX/Ops Dev could occur for any number of reasons attributable to either 
maintenance or operations (e.g. the pilot may be weather restricted).  Furthermore, since 
this number is not broken out for maintenance at most of the participating units, our data 
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is mixed and thus any results cannot be linked specifically to QA manning effectiveness.  
We are including it in the study because it had a greater than fifty percent response 
measure as a primary impact metric from the subject matter experts from the Phase-One, 
Delphi survey. 
The data in Appendix AF reveal nine of 14 bases indicate moderate negative 
correlations between MX/Ops Devs counts and QA manning effectiveness rates in at 
least one of their assigned aircraft units during at least one lag period.  Furthermore, eight 
bases exhibited low-to-moderate positive correlations between MX/Ops Devs counts and 
QA manning effectiveness.  An overall analysis does not support an ACC-wide trend for 
a correlation between MX/Ops Devs counts and QA manning effectiveness levels but 
several bases indicate a potential relationship (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix 
F).  The next metric we will examine is the Personnel Evaluations Pass Rate metric.  
Personnel Evaluations (PE) Pass Rate  
The PE Rate is a lagging indicator that measures the ability of personnel to 
perform tasks in their duty position.  A PE occurs when QA personnel perform an over-
the-shoulder evaluation of a technician performing a task or part of a task for which the 
technician being inspected is trained and signed off for.  Master Sergeant Sansavera, the 
Air Education Training representative attached to ACC/HQ Training, stated that the 
reported QA pass rate is considered as a key measure of the training effectiveness in the 
field (Sansavera, 2005).  Thus we are using this as our proxy variable to examine the 
potential impact that QA manning effectiveness has on training instead of using other 
more traditional measures such as number of personnel in overtime training or Career 
Development Course Pass rates.  The PE rate is mathematically determined as: 
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NumberPersonnelEvaluationsPassedPEPass(%)= *100
NumberPersonnelEvaluationAttempted
  
The data in the PE Pass Rate correlation table in Appendix AQ reveal seven of 14 bases 
exhibited moderate to high positive correlations between PE Pass rates and QA manning 
effectiveness rates in at least one of their assigned aircraft units during at least one lag 
period (see Appendix AQ).  Furthermore, seven bases exhibited low-to-moderate 
negative correlations between PE Pass rates and QA manning effectiveness.  An overall 
analysis does not support an ACC-wide trend for a correlation between PE Pass rates and 
QA manning effectiveness levels but several bases indicate a potential relationship (see 
Appendix F).  The next metric we will examine is Phase Key Task List Pass rate. 
Phase Key Task List (Phase KTL) Pass Rate  
The Phase KTL Pass Rate metric is a subset of the overall KTL Pass Rate 
examined earlier in this chapter.  It is calculated in the same fashion, but is focused solely 
on the results of QA inspections performed on aircraft after all maintenance is completed 
and before the aircraft rolls out of a phase dock inspection.  Since not all bases in the 
study perform Phase Dock QA inspections, we aggregated only those bases that track 
Phase KTL inspections into this correlations analysis.  From the table in Appendix AR,  
we find that five of the 13 bases that track Phase KTL Passes experienced moderate 
negative correlations between Phase KTL Pass rates and QA manning effectiveness (i.e. 
pass rates are going down with increased QA manning effectiveness) and only seven 
bases had low-to-moderate positive correlations.  Overall, the data is inconclusive for a 
command-wide correlation between QA manning effectiveness and Phase KTL Pass rates 
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(see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  We will now examine the Quality 
Verification Inspection Pass Rate metric.   
Quality Verification Inspection (QVI) Pass Rate  
The QVI Pass Rate metric is an inspection that QA personnel perform that can 
cover a broad array of processes.  It could be an inspection on a completed maintenance 
action or one in progress, or an inspection on a facility or on an equipment item.  It is a 
macro-measure of unit and technician performance and provides an overall status of 
maintenance operations and compliance with directives.  It is calculated as: 
NumberQVIsPassedQVIPass(%)= *100
NumberQVIsPerformed
 
The table in Appendix AQ reveals nine of the bases having a moderate-to-high positive 
correlation between QVI Pass rates and QA manning effectiveness (an increase in QA 
manning effectiveness is accompanied by an increase in QVI Pass rates).  Also, five of 
the bases’ data indicate a moderate-to-strong negative correlation (an increase in QA 
manning effectiveness is accompanied by a decrease in the QVI Pass rate).  This is 
interesting because it could be signaling that the QVI trend at a particular base may be a 
function of management emphasis and organizational dynamics (see Survey, Part-1 
Comments, Appendix F).  The next metrics to be examined are the Repeat and Recur 
Rates. 
Repeat and Recur Rates  
Although these two measures are tracked separately at HQ ACC/LGP, AFI 21-
101 does not break them out.  However, since we have the data, we will analyze them 
separately here.  The mathematical calculations for repeats and recurs are (respectively):  
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TotalRepeatsRepeat(%) *100
TotalNumberPilotReportedDiscrepancies
=  
 
TotalRecursRecurs(%) *100
TotalNumberPilotReportedDiscrepancies
=  
 A Repeat is when the same malfunction occurs on the very next flight after it was 
repaired and a Recur is when the same malfunction for which an aircraft was repaired, 
occurs on the 2nd through 4th flights.  According to AFI 21-101, Repeat and Recur rate 
metrics are leading indicators and perhaps the most important and accurate measure of 
the unit’s maintenance quality.  When we examine the Repeat Correlations table in 
Appendix AS, we find that ten of the 14 bases have at least one aircraft type with low-to-
moderate negative correlations between Repeat rates and QA manning effectiveness rates 
and seven bases with low-to-moderate positive correlations.  When we examine the 
Recur correlations table (see Appendix AS), we discover that eleven of 14 bases have at 
least one aircraft type with negative correlations between Recur rates and QA manning 
effectiveness rates, and six with positive correlations.  The overall analysis suggests that 
Repeat and Recur rates are potentially trended with QA manning effectiveness levels at 
the majority of bases in the study (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  The next 
metric to be examined is the Safety and Technical Violation Count. 
Safety and Technical Violation (STV) Count  
The STV Count is a composite metric and is the number of times QA personnel 
observe either: (1) a person performing an unsafe act (DSV); (2) a person not following 
technical directives (TDV); or (3) an unsatisfactory condition (UCR).  This metric is 
computed in the same way as DSVs explained earlier.  Like the QVI Pass rate, it is a 
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macro-metric and gives maintenance managers quick feedback to enable them to take 
immediate corrective measure to avoid injury or damage to property. 
The STV correlations table in Appendix AL reveals that eight of the 14 bases 
have a moderate-to-strong negative correlation between STV counts and QA manning 
effectiveness while six bases have a weak-to-moderate positive correlation between STV 
counts and QA manning effectiveness.  This seems to suggest that there is a relationship 
across ACC bases for STV counts relative to QA manning effectiveness where as QA 
manning effectiveness increases, the STV count rate declines possibly due to QA’s 
increased presence influencing personnel to avoid taking shortcuts (see Survey, Part-1 
Comments, Appendix F).  The next metric we examine is the Technical Data Violation 
Count. 
Technical Data Violation (TDV) Count  
The TDV count is a subset of STV counts and is calculated in the same manner.  
A TDV occurs when an individual performs a task, and either doesn’t have technical data 
with him/her, or fails to follow the procedures according to the technical data.  Analysis 
of the data in Appendix AM reveals that eight of the 14 bases have a moderate-to-strong 
negative correlation between TDV counts and QA manning effectiveness while only five 
bases have a weak-to-moderate positive correlation between TDV counts and QA 
manning effectiveness.  This metric is behaving consistently with the STV count. This 
suggests that there is a correlation across ACC bases for TDV counts relative to QA 
manning effectiveness (i.e. as QA manning effectiveness increases, the TDV count rate 
declines) possibly due to QA’s increased presence influencing personnel to avoid taking 
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shortcuts (see Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  The next metric to be examined 
is the Total Non-Mission Capable for Maintenance Rate. 
Total Non-Mission Capable for Maintenance (TNMCM) Rate   
The TNMCM Rate metric is a lagging indicator and is considered to be the most 
common and useful measure for determining if maintenance is being performed quickly 
and accurately.  It is the average percentage of possessed aircraft that cannot complete 
their primary assigned mission due to maintenance reasons (except depot-type 
maintenance) (AFI 21-101, para 1.10.3.11.2).  The correlation table in Appendix AG 
indicates that twelve of 14 bases exhibited moderate-to-high negative correlations 
between TNMCM rates and QA manning effectiveness rates in at least one of their 
assigned aircraft units during at least one lag period.  Furthermore, five bases exhibited 
low-to-moderate positive correlations between TNMCM rates and QA manning 
effectiveness.  An overall analysis suggests that there is a negative correlative trend for 
TNMCM rates and QA manning effectiveness levels across the bases under study (see 
Survey, Part-1 Comments, Appendix F).  The last metric we will examine is the 
Technical Order Improvement Submitted Count. 
Technical Order Improvement Submitted (TO Imp Submitted) Count  
The TO Imp Submitted Count metric reflects the number of instances where 
technicians submit TO improvement recommendations.  Like the DRs Submitted metric, 
the TO Imp Submitted metric measures the proactive level of personnel within a 
maintenance organization.  Our theory is that the more technical order improvements that 
are submitted, the more deeply engaged technicians are with their jobs.  Analysis of the 
correlation table in Appendix AK reveals a dichotomous split between and among the 
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ACC bases in the study with half exhibiting a weak-to-moderate positive correlation 
between TO Imp Submitted and the calculated QA manning effectiveness and the other 
half revealing a weak-to-moderate negative correlation between TO Imp Submitted and 
the calculated QA manning effectiveness.  Now that we have examined all of the 
indicated metrics for a possible linear relationship with QA manning effectiveness, we 
conduct one last test to determine any significant relationships (see Survey, Part-1 
Comments, Appendix F).  We will do this in this next and last section of this chapter by 
employing statistical linear regression. 
Regressing the Data 
In order to determine linear relationships for the types of data across all bases 
under study, we performed simple linear regressions on the indicated metrics.  Because 
we are seeking an interpretive model to be used at the base level, we aggregated the 
delimited data in metric areas containing multiple data sets across all assigned aircraft 
units at each base to get an average measure (i.e. MC, TNMCM, Break, etc.).  This 
enabled us to describe the average behavior of the variable across multiple aircraft types. 
However, the count-type data did not require this transformation.   
We arranged the data into columns for all participating ACC bases in a 
contemporaneous (no-lag) format with each base and then ran each of the regressions and 
analyzed the output specifically for level of significance and direction of relationship.  
Although we had several metrics with respectable R-squared values, the degree of fit is 
not our most important consideration.  This is because, although the R-squared value is 
considered as a prime factor when determining usefulness of a predictive model, we are 
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creating interpretive models.  Thus R-squares of greater than 0.05 were considered useful 
as long as the p-value was significant.  After all, we can not reasonably expect to have 
any single independent variable (in our case QA manning effectiveness) explain all of the 
variation for any of the dependent metric variables in the study – there are just too many 
moving parts in a USAF flying unit.  However, the R-squared values do provide useful 
information nonetheless.  One final concern did emerge in our analysis.   
In our data we found five of nine metric data types with Durbin-Watson test 
values that were outside of the normally acceptable level.  However, according to Oxley, 
although there are transformations that can be applied to the data to try and eliminate 
this condition, it may not always be successful (Oxley, 2000).  In our study we understand 
a priori that this will most likely be the outcome since our data is serially related.  
Furthermore, recent studies indicate that even when heteroskedasticity cannot be 
eliminated, valid inferences can still be made (Oxley, 2000).  Since we appended our 
base-level data sets into a single file, we therefore expect serial correlation (see Appendix 
BT).  This may bias these parameters, but Oxley implies that it will not affect our overall 
conclusions because it affects efficiency instead of accuracy.        
Interpreting the Data 
The QA manning variable is interpreted as an elasticity value for non-count 
dependent metrics.  The Elasticity formula is: 
 
y,x
ΔY X %ΔYE = • =
ΔX Y %ΔX
 (E= expected value; Δ=the change in) 
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So, for our purposes, a one percent increase in the QA Manning value will yield a 0.7 
percent decrease in the break rate.  This also holds true for the other dependent variables 
listed in Tables 22 and 23.  Conversely, when interpreting the impact on a Count-type 
metric (see Table 24), the marginal improvement is an amount (e.g. a -0.01 Dropped 
Object incremental change means that a 100 percent increase in QA Manning 
Effectiveness will result in one less dropped object at each base).   Tables 25 and 26 show 
the respective compiled information for rate and count data (also refer to Appendixes BW 
through CG for regression outputs).  
Table 22 – Statistically Significant Metrics (rates – part-1) 
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Table 23 – Statistically Significant Metrics (rates – part-2) 
 
 
 
Table 24 – Statistically Significant Metrics (counts) 
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Table 25 – Compiled Elasticities for RATE Metrics 
 
 
 
Table 26 – Compiled Incremental Changes for COUNT Metrics  
 
 
An Example Benefit Cost Analysis Using the Dropped Objects Results 
A thumbnail benefit cost analysis provides some guidance on the role of QA in 
reducing costs to the Air Force.  This example assumed an annual personnel cost of 
$75,000 for each QA NCO added.  Also, note that the result of adding one NCO would 
be a four percent increase in QA manning effectiveness until the QA flight reaches 100 
percent manning effectiveness.  Furthermore, we assumed a conservative average 
dropped object-cost of $2,000 per event (this includes all costs across the entire value 
chain – cost of the part, the investigation, the resultant inspections, etc.).   
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We found that a four percent increase in QA manning effectiveness (adding one 
NCO to each base’s QA staff) suggests that we will have approximately four fewer 
dropped objects at each base.  When applied to a single base, this translated to: 
Annual Dropped Object Savings ( 4.4DOPs)*16Bases)*(12Months)*($1K) $1,689,600= − =  
 
Next we calculated the costs of adding one NCO to each base: 
NCO$$All Bases=($75000perNCO)*(16bases)=$1,200,000  
Finally we divided the Dropped Object savings by the cost of the “additional” personnel 
to come up with the Benefit Cost Ratio:  
$1,689,600DOPsavingsBenefit Cost Ratio 1.408
$1,200,000NCOcost
= =  
Thus with a 1.408 benefit cost ratio for Dropped Objects, the USAF could realize an 
annual savings of $489 Thousand.  This example alone suggests that increasing the QA 
manning effectiveness (i.e. assigning one more NCO to each ACC base’s QA flight 
against authorized slots) is justified solely on the basis of decreasing Dropped Objects. 
Metrics with No Direct Statistical Relationship to QA Manning Effectiveness  
Seventeen of the metrics that the subject matter experts in the field indicated in 
Survey, Part-1 that might be impacted by QA manning effectiveness were found not to 
have statistically significant relationships.  However, even though these metrics did not 
pass the regression analysis, they should not be ignored by management (see Table 27 
and review subject matter experts’ comments in Appendix F). 
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Table 27 – Metrics Not Statistically Significant 
 
Overview of the Next Chapter 
Chapter VI concludes this research study where we answer the three investigative 
questions and the research question.  We also present managerial implications.  Finally, 
we review the research limitations and provide recommendations for future research. 
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the conclusions drawn from the research by addressing 
each of the investigative questions (IQ) that will in-turn answer the research question.  
We will then present managerial implications and research limitations with the study.  
Lastly, we will discuss potential areas for future research.     
Findings 
 This section answers the questions posited in Chapter I.  IQ-1 and IQ-2 are 
answered through the Delphi survey as analyzed in Chapter IV, while IQ-3 is answered 
through a statistical analysis of the metric data indicated in Chapter V. 
Investigative Question #1: Which key unit- and wing-level metrics are most 
affected by an empty QA manning position or a mismatch? 
This was answered through a Delphi survey.  Thirty-four field- and headquarters-
level subject matter experts performed a computer-based qualitative survey where they 
indicated on a six-point LIKERT scale how they felt the aircraft/munitions maintenance 
QA function impacted each of fifteen listed metrics.  The Delphi panel experts were then 
given the opportunity to provide additional metrics which they felt would be significantly 
impacted by QA effectiveness.  The results were then aggregated to develop a candidate 
list of metrics for further analysis.  In the analysis, it was not surprising that the majority 
of resultant metrics on the list having a 50 percent or greater median value as determined 
by the Delphi survey, were comprised of metrics already tracked at unit and headquarters 
levels (see Appendix G for a list of all indicated metrics and their significance levels).   
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Investigative Question #2: What is the effectiveness of a person without the 
Unit Manning Document-authorized Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) when 
performing the QA duties of another AFSC (how good is the fit)?  
This question was answered through a Delphi survey.  Thirty-two subject matter 
experts completed one round of the Delphi survey and 14 completed two rounds.  A 
supplemental Delphi survey was also completed to account for AFSCs that were 
identified as new information after the initial aggregation of manning information from 
the units at the beginning of the study.  Fourteen subject matter experts completed this 
supplemental survey.  The result was the creation of a matrix that allows maintenance 
managers to determine with some confidence the potential effectiveness of an individual 
performing in a QA position designated for an AFSC other than the one they possess (see 
Table 14).   This tool also gives the maintenance manager the ability to analyze the entire 
QA flight for effectiveness to gain an overall flight manning effectiveness.  We did this 
using the following rules:     
 
1) If an authorized QA manpower position was filled with a person possessing the 
AFSC called for in the UMD, the position effectiveness was rated at 100 percent 
effective (e.g. a person with AFSC 2A5X3 was assigned to a 2A5X3 QA 
position).   
2) If the person filling a QA position possessed an AFSC other than that called for in 
the UMD, the appropriate effectiveness level derived from the QA manning 
effectiveness charts was assigned to that position (e.g. a person with AFSC 
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2A5X3 was assigned to a 2A5X1 QA position would be rated at an effectiveness 
level of 61 percent as derived from the QA Manning Effectiveness Matrix).   
3) Instances where UMD manpower positions were double-filled (i.e. two persons 
possessing AFSC 2A3X3 were assigned against one UMD-authorized 2A3X3 
manpower position), were rated as 100 percent effective.  The rationale for this 
was that, although not authorized for in the UMD, these “extra” personnel provide 
capability and more capability “should be better”, thus proper credit should be 
applied to possibly offset deficiencies in other areas.   
4) All unfilled QA positions were rated as zero percent effective.   
The results of this analysis were then applied to each of 16 QA flights’ historical 
manning to achieve the overall by-month manning effectiveness fit for a 24-month 
period.  We applied these results statistically against accumulated metrics for data types 
identified in Investigative Question 1. 
Investigative Question #3: What is the relationship between QA manning 
effectiveness and the key unit and wing-level metrics? 
This question was answered first through a quantitative correlation analysis, 
together with a qualitative interpretation using time lags to address latent variable 
characteristics.  We first performed a macro-level analysis on unit-level correlation 
relationships between each of the dependant variables and calculated QA manning 
effectiveness at each base.  We then subjected each metric data type to a cross-sectional 
statistical analysis across all 16 participating Air Combat Command bases to determine 
relationships.   
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The statistical regression analysis uncovered nine of the 26 metrics identified by 
the subject matter experts in the Delphi survey as being statistically significant (see 
Tables 25 and 26).  We then performed an example benefit cost analysis for changes in 
QA manning effectiveness as they related to Dropped Objects.  This analysis, using 
hypothetical cost values, presented compelling evidence for maintenance managers to 
scrutinize each decision to leave a manning slot empty, or to install a person with the 
other than UMD-authorized credentials when manning individual QA positions.  These 
tradeoff investigations can help determine which management mitigating strategies to 
employ to offset these potentialities.  
The impact that maintenance QA has on key unit- and wing-level metrics is 
summed up very eloquently in the following e-mail quote from one of our maintainer 
experts in the field:  
 
Chief Moore, 
 
Concerning our phone conversation about QA Effectiveness, I would like to voice 
an opinion I have from 22 years of aircraft maintenance experience.  I have worked 
as a ground crew member, assistant crew chief, crew chief, branch trainer, quality 
assurance inspector, shift supervisor, flight chief and I now work in wing safety 
preventing FOD/ DOP and flight related mishaps.  I know the playing field inside and 
out.  I have felt the pain, instilled and facilitated it concerning quality assurance, and 
the impact it has on the aircraft maintenance community.   
Quality Assurance’s presence impacts the maintenance community by instilling 
the old <stuff> rolls down hill theory.  When Quality Assurance discovers or is 
informed of a trend that is not IAW TO guidance, they level the playing field by 
letting the units know that they will be putting emphasis on that area.  The units 
respond by ensuring the area is in compliance with AF directives. Any breach in the 
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agreement will surface quickly as QA holds up their end of the bargain by identifying 
any more discrepancies.  Those discrepancies are then disseminated by the 
leadership when the quality inspection result is presented to the unit.  In turn, actions 
are taken to correct the unsatisfactory condition.  
v/r 
MSgt Webb 
2 BW FOD/DOP Prevention NCO  
Recommendations for Action 
 We propose the following recommendations for action.  Note that they are not 
without interpretation and thus should not be followed blindly.   
1) Deploy the QA Manning Effectiveness Matrix and instructions to field QA units 
to enable them to calculate their current overall QA manning effectiveness rates.   
2) Each unit could use the effectiveness matrix on an individual basis to determine 
the effectiveness of a person possessing a “mismatch” AFSC would be in a QA 
position.  This will enable QA managers faced with recurring shortfalls to make 
more informed decisions when assigning personnel from high-demand, low-
density specialties.   
3) Each unit could perform an analysis of their key unit- and wing-level metrics for 
presence of trends or to uncover areas where they are consistently below 
standards.   
4) To uncover useful vectors to apply management attention to, each unit could 
perform a statistical regression through their analysis shop to determine the 
strength and direction of any linear relationships with the calculated QA manning 
effectiveness.  This will help them rule in/out low QA manning effectiveness as a 
potential contributing factor to deficient areas indicated by their metrics.   
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Future Research 
Future research efforts could concentrate on performing a Benefit Cost Ratio 
analysis with other military or civilian organizations with high-demand, low-density 
resources.  This would provide unit managers with empirical data to support manning 
decisions.  Also, the metric relationships that were indicated in the study could possibly 
be investigated through a structural equation modeling technique to uncover potential 
additional linkages.  Lastly, this methodology could be applied to other low-density, 
high-demand functions to uncover potential impacts in order to develop strategies to 
mitigate problems before they can occur or worsen.       
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Appendix A:  Delphi Computer-Based Survey – Part-1 
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Appendix B:  Delphi Computer-Based Survey – Part-2 
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Appendix C:  Delphi ROUND TWO Survey, Part-2 E-mail Instructions  
 
Sir/Ma’am, 
  
Let me first thank you for completing the FIRST ROUND of this DELPHI study.  As you 
know, a DELPHI study is a qualitative procedure in an attempt to get subject matter 
experts to gain agreement within certain statistical bounds on a subject in which they 
are expert.  We have analyzed the data from ROUND ONE and found sufficient 
statistical difference (specifically the coefficient of variation) on most ratings amongst all 
PANEL'S experts to perform a SECOND ROUND.  The attached EXCEL file contains 4 
matrix sheets (Matrix #1, #2, #3, and #4).  Each sheet has 3 tables on it: (1) Working 
Matrix of Group Mean Ratings -- Out of Limit Ratings; (2) How You Rated -- Round 
#1; (3) Means for All Panel Member Ratings.  The basic instructions for completing 
this DELPHI SECOND ROUND is to analyze the aggregate results from the top table on 
each <Matrix> sheet against your ratings from ROUND ONE (your data is provided in 
the middle table labeled "How You Rated -- Round #1"), and adjust your ratings as you 
deem appropriate. Please ensure to make all adjustments to the top table on each matrix 
page.  On the EXCEL file there are two other sheets: (1) AFMAN 36-2108 AFSC Duty 
Desc and (2) Base Files.  The AFMAN 36-2108 sheet has all of the job descriptions for 
all of the AFSCs on the survey. You can disregard the <Base Model> sheet -- it is 
included because it is necessary for all of the links to work within the file. I have also 
attached a separate word.doc file with detailed instructions on how to complete the 
survey. Lastly, I sincerely apologize but due to the tremendous amount of time ROUND 
ONE took, ROUND TWO will have to be completed and sent back to me by COB 24 
Dec 04. 
 
Vr 
 
CMSgt Moore 
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Appendix D:  Delphi ROUND TWO Survey, Part-2 Instructions 
 
AFSC Fit Matrix for Aircraft QA 
Survey Control Number: USAF 04-098 
Privacy Notice  
The following information is provided as required by the Privacy Act of 1974:  
Purpose: To obtain information regarding potential effects of manning assignment 
practices within USAF Aircraft Quality Assurance (QA) flights. You have been 
identified as a person with a wide-breadth of experience in the aircraft and/or 
munitions maintenance manning arena and further, you have already voluntarily 
completed ROUND ONE of Survey, Part-2. This is ROUND TWO of the survey and 
we are asking you to analyze the aggregated responses from ROUND ONE and make 
changes as you see fit. Please use the 0% to 100% rating scale and evaluate how 
well a “typical” person holding each of the listed AFSCs would reasonably be 
expected to perform the duties of a person in each of the listed AFSC QA positions.  
For example, a dog trainer might perform the duties of a cat trainer at an 
effectiveness level ‘20%’ where a dog trainer would perform the duties of a dog 
trainer at an effectiveness level ‘100%’ (note: 0% = Totally Ineffective ; 100% = 
Totally Effective ).  
Routine Use: The survey results will be used to assist aircraft maintenance managers 
when making QA manning decisions.  A final report will be provided to participating 
organizations.  No analysis of individual responses will be conducted and only 
members of the Air Force Institute of Technology research team will be permitted 
access to the raw data. 
Participation: Participation is VOLUNTARY.  No adverse action will be taken 
against any member who does not participate in this survey or who does not complete 
any part of the survey. 
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Instructions 
• Base your answers on your own thoughts & experiences. 
• This attached EXCEL file uses your DELPHI Panel Member number and is 
personalized with your responses from ROUND ONE.  It is your file and 
only you can fill it in!  
• Open the EXCEL file labeled with your assigned DELPHI Member number.  
Then, click on <Matrix #1> sheet at the bottom of the page.  Go through the top 
table on this page and analyze the DELPHI Panel Group’s MEAN statistical 
ratings from ROUND ONE.  Compare these MEAN ratings against your ratings 
from ROUND ONE that appear in the middle table on the same sheet. Make all 
changes to the top table only. The third and bottom table on the sheet contains 
all of the DELPHI Panel Group’s MEAN statistical ratings from ROUND ONE 
(Note: this table is provided for your information only because some of the top 
table’s cells are darkened in and locked out due to their statistical significance. 
The top table’s cells with percentages have statistical differences across 
DELPHI Panel responses and can be adjusted. 
• Your ROUND ONE data is provided in the table labeled "How You Rated -- 
Round #1" (NS in a cell means No Score was given in ROUND ONE). Please 
note that you can provide an AFSC combination rating on ROUND TWO even 
if you did not provide one in ROUND ONE.          
• The ratings in the top table are the statistical MEANS of how all DELPHI Panel 
Experts rated each of the AFSC combinations. These subjective ratings indicate 
how effective the group feels a “typical” person with the AFSC appearing down 
the left side would be if assigned to the QA AFSC position that intersects that 
cell from the top row of AFSCs.   
• In ROUND ONE, we used a rating scale of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 which translated 
to 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100% respectively. In ROUND TWO, these 
ratings have been converted to “percentages of effectiveness” in order to 
“tighten up” the data and give rating flexibility.   
• Where the same AFSC from the left column (Y-axis) and QA AFSC position 
from across the top of the table (X-axis) intersect within the table, they are 
darkened out in the top table and are marked as 100% Totally Effective in the 
middle and bottom tables.   
• Remember, these are personnel performing duties of personnel in a “typical” 
aircraft/ munitions QA flight.  Do not rate personnel as if they were performing 
normal duty tasks as they would when assigned to a MX squadron, MSA, or a 
flight line AMU.  
• Note: the 2A590 AFSC is a feeder to the 2A300 Chief Enlisted Manager (CEM) 
AFSC.  The 2A3X0 and 2A6X0 AFSCs are 9-level or CEM positions; all others 
are 5 or 7-level positions.  Rate all AFSCs in the aggregate (i.e. no difference 
between a ‘5‘ and ‘7’ or ‘9‘ and ‘0’ levels).    
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• When filling in the table with percentage effectiveness ratings, evaluate them 
against what you understand encompasses the whole AFSC duty position and 
not just AFSC-specific tasks (i.e. in some QA flights, an avionics technician 
‘might’ perform APG task inspections, assist in Weight and Balance operations, 
and/or evaluate drop-tank build-up operations besides only inspecting avionics-
type tasks). 
• Each table cell has a comment that appears if you pass the pointer over each cell 
or click on the cell.  The comment refers to how effective a person with the 
AFSC from the left column (Y-axis) would be if assigned to the QA AFS duty 
position from the top row (X-axis).  Each cell has its own specific comment – no 
two comments are the same.  (NOTE: the ‘comment’ may mislead you if you 
just use the arrow buttons for navigation within the table -- you have to 
<click> on each cell).  This will help you get through faster {e.g. Crew Chief 
(Non-Tac Acft) Jymn/Crftmn effectiveness in Structural MX Jymn/Crftmn QA 
Position}.  
• If you are not familiar with a particular AFSC, leave that cell blank. 
• After completing sheet < Matrix #1>, click on and open up the sheets labeled 
<Matrix #2>, <Matrix #3>, and <Matrix #4> one at a time, in numerical 
order, and complete each of the top tables using the same criteria and procedures 
you used on sheet <Matrix #1>.      
• E-mail the completed EXCEL file back NLT COB 24 Dec 04 to the 
RESEARCHER ONLY. 
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Appendix E:  Delphi ROUND TWO Survey, Part-2 Instrument 
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Appendix F:  Historical Manning Spreadsheet Sent Out to ACC QA Flights 
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Appendix G:  Delphi, Survey Part-1 Results 
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Appendix H:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A0X1 
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Appendix I:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A3X0 
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Appendix J:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A3X1 
 
 
 
 152
Appendix K:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A3X2 
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Appendix L:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A3X3 
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Appendix M:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A590 
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Appendix N:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A5X1 
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Appendix O:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A5X2 
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Appendix P:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A5X3 
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Appendix Q:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X0 
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Appendix R:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X1 
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Appendix S:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X2 
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Appendix T:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X3 
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Appendix U:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X4 
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Appendix V:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X5 
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Appendix W:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A6X6 
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Appendix X:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A7X3 
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Appendix Y:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2A7X4 
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Appendix Z:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2E1X1 
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Appendix AA:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2E2X1 
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Appendix AB:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2M0X1 
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Appendix AC:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2W0X1 
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Appendix AD:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2W1X1 
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Appendix AE:  Delphi Survey, Part-2 Response for AFSC 2W2X1 
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Appendix AF:  Abort Rate and MX/Ops Deviation Count Correlations 
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Appendix AG:  MC and TNMCM Rate Correlations 
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Appendix AH:  Break and Fix Rate Correlations 
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Appendix AI:  Cannibalization Rate Correlations  
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Appendix AJ:  Dropped Objects and Foreign Object Damage Count Correlations 
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Appendix AK:  Deficiency Report and TO Improvement Submitted Correlations 
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Appendix AL:  Safety and Technical Violation Count Correlations 
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 Appendix AM:  DSV and TDV Count Correlations 
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Appendix AN:  FSE and MSE Rate Correlations 
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Appendix AO:  Combined and Ground Mishap Count Correlations  
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Appendix AP:  Flight Mishaps and In-Flight Emergency Rate Correlations 
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Appendix AQ:  QVI and PE Pass Rate Correlations 
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Appendix AR:  Key Task List (KTL) and Phase KTL Pass Rate Correlations 
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Appendix AS:  Recur and Repeat Rate Correlations 
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Appendix AT:  Barksdale AFB Data  
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Appendix AU:  Beale AFB Data 
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Appendix AV:  Cannon AFB Data 
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Appendix AW:  Davis-Monthan AFB Data 
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Appendix AX:  Dyess AFB Data 
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Appendix AY:  Ellsworth AFB Data 
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Appendix AZ:  Holloman AFB Data 
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Appendix BA:  Langley AFB Data  
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Appendix BB:  Minot AFB Data 
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Appendix BC:  Mountain Home AFB Data 
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Appendix BD:  Nellis AFB Data 
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Appendix BE:  Offutt AFB Data 
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Appendix BF:  Pope AFB Data 
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Appendix BG:  Seymour-Johnson AFB Data 
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Appendix BH:  Shaw AFB Data 
 
 
 
 223
  
 
 224
Appendix BI:  Whiteman AFB Data 
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Appendix BJ:  Data Arrangement for Statistical Regression (10-pages) 
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Appendix BK-1:  Barksdale AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BL-1:  Beale AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BL-2:  Beale AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BM-1:  Cannon AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BM-2:  Cannon AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BN-1:  Davis-Monthan AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BN-2:  Davis-Monthan AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BO-1:  Dyess AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BO-2:  Dyess AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BP-1:  Ellsworth AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BP-2:  Ellsworth AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BQ-1:  Holloman AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BQ-2:  Holloman AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BR-1:  Langley AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BR-2:  Langley AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BS-1:  Minot AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BS-2:  Minot AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BT-1:  Mountain Home AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BT-2:  Mountain Home AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BU-1:  Nellis AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BU-2:  Nellis AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BV-1:  Offutt AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BV-2:  Offutt AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BW:  Pope AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BX-1:  Seymour-Johnson AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BX-2:  Seymour-Johnson AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BY-1:  Shaw AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BY-2:  Shaw AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix BZ-1:  Whiteman AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2003 
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Appendix BZ-2:  Whiteman AFB QA Manning Calculations for 2004 
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Appendix CA:  Survey, Part-1 Results w/ Validation 
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Appendix CB:  Survey, Part-1 Results, Fill-In w/ Validation 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix CC:  Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and Break Rate 
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Appendix CD:  Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and CANN Rate 
 
 
 
 
Appendix CE:  Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and DOP Count 
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Appendix CF:  Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and FSE Rate 
 
 
 
 
Appendix CG:  Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and KTL Pass Rate 
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Appendix CH:  Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and MSE Rate 
 
 
 
 
Appendix CI:  Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and QVI Pass Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 272
Appendix CJ:  Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and Repeat Rate 
 
 
 
 
Appendix CK:  Regression for QA Manning Effectiveness and STV Count 
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Appendix CL:  AFSC Job Descriptions (3-sheets) 
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